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NOTES
DRAWING THE LINE IN REGULATORY
TAKINGS LAW: HOW A BENEFITS FRACTON
SUPPORTS THE FEE SIMPLE APPROACH TO
THE DENOMINATOR PROBLEM
Benjamin Allee*
Within earshot of Block Island Sound, along the imprecise shores of
Westerly, Rhode Island's Winnipaug Pond, roughly twenty acres of
wetlands and marshlands, undisturbed, ebb and flow with the ocean
tide.1 Small pools collect here at high tide, creating a sanctuary for
fish and birds.2 At low tide the marsh buffers against flooding, and it
collects and filters meandering runoff.' As wetlands, these twenty
acres exemplify "the Nation's most biologically active areas."4
Enacting the Clean Water Act, Congress underscored its mission to
preserve areas like that lining Rhode Island's seashore, when it
declared "that the systemic destruction of the Nation's wetlands is
causing serious, permanent ecological damage .... The unregulated
destruction of these areas is a matter which needs to be corrected."5
* I would like to thank Professor William Treanor for his thoughtful guidance
throughout all the stages of this paper, and Doug Hendrickson for helping me to see
lines all over the earth that I never saw before.
1. See Palazzolo v. State ex rel Tavares, 746 A.2d 707, 710 (R-I. 2000), rev'd sub
nom. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 121 S. Ct. 2448 (2001). The certiorari-worthy issue in
Palazzolo was whether a property owner who acquired title after a regulation was in
place could prevail on a takings claim based on that regulation. See infra notes 103-09
and accompanying text. Reasonable expectations notwithstanding, the case also
presents the denominator issue in simple, precise terms. The Supreme Court declined
to address the denominator issue, however, as Palazzolo did not properly present it.
See Palazzolo, 121 S. Ct. at 2464; infra note 163.
2. Palazzolo, 746 A.2d at 710.
3. Id.
4. Brace v. United States, 48 Fed. Cl. 272, 279 (2000) (quoting 123 Cong. Rec.
26,697 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1977) (statement of Sen. Muskie)) (commenting on the
purpose behind the recently enacted Clean Water Act); see generally United States v.
Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 123-24 (1985) (discussing the Clean
Water Act).
5. Brace, 48 Fed. Cl. at 279. In Palazzolo, Rhode Island state law, not the Clean
Water Act, controlled the permit procedures for wetlands conservation. The state
and federal legislation serve the same goal, however, of preserving coastal wetlands.
See Palazzolo, 746 A.2d at 710-11.
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In 1978, Anthony Palazzolo obtained title to the roughly twenty-
acre parcel bordering Winnipaug Pond,6 approximately eighteen acres
of wetlands and a "few" upland acres.7 In 1983 and 1985, Palazzolo
submitted development proposals to Rhode Island's Coastal
Resources Management Council ("CRMC").8 The first plan proposed
filling the entire marsh. The second, eleven acres of the marsh.' The
CRMC denied both proposals, finding that each threatened too
adverse an impact on the existing wetlands and Winnipaug Pond.
Palazzolo filed suit in Rhode Island Superior Court, alleging that the
CRMC had taken his property under the Fifth Amendment."
Palazzolo claimed $3,150,000 in damages resulting from the denial of
his development permits, based on an appraiser's calculation of the
value of a 74-lot residential subdivision plan for the property.12 At
trial, the CRMC established that $200,000 in development value
remained in the upland portion of the property.13
The economic loss to Palazzolo's parcel can be viewed in either of
two ways. Wetlands comprise eighteen of the parcel's twenty acres.
The CRMC rendered those wetland acres valueless, 14 and preserved
the value in the two-acre, upland portion of the parcel. On the one
hand, Palazzolo has suffered a 90% loss in value; eighteen of his
twenty acres no longer retain economic benefit because of the
CRMC. 15 On the other hand, Palazzolo has suffered a 100% loss in
value; disregarding the upland portion, all eighteen of his wetlands
acres have suffered a total loss in value. Simply, either Palazzolo has
lost some of the value of all of his property-18/20-or all of the value
of some of his property- 18/18.16
6. As the sole shareholder of the previous owner, Shore Gardens, Inc., Palazzolo
had been involved with the property since 1959. See Palazzolo, 121 S. Ct. at 2455-56.
7. Palazzolo, 746 A.2d at 710 n.1 ("The exact size of the entire parcel has not
been specified by the parties.").
8. See Palazzolo, 121 S. Ct. at 2456. The 1983 application proposed constructing





13. Id. at 2464.
14. "Valueless," in actuality, represents a rounded-down estimate for the purpose
of simplicity. The state court found that $157,500 in value remained in the wetlands
portion as an open-space gift. Palazzolo v. State ex rel. Tavares, 746 A.2d 707, 715
(R.I. 2000), rev'd sub nom. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 121 S. Ct. 2448 (2001); cf infra
note 74 (emphasizing the unlikelihood of a regulation rendering property
"valueless").
15. Monetarily, Palazzolo's loss is 94% -$3,150,000/3,350,000--when the property
remains undivided. The use of acreage for determining value, however, simplifies the
equation without sacrificing any necessary considerations.
16. See generally Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470,
497 (1987); Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the




The former calculation reflects the customary, time-tested
calculation of loss measured against the fee simple. "Conceptual
severance" describes the latter calculation, which is the process of
weighing lost value against a parcel smaller than the fee simple. 7
Several "concepts," in theory, can "sever" a fee simple." "Functional
severance" divides a property according to use. "Temporal
severance" divides property according to time. "Vertical severance"
according to a property's profile, "from the center of the earth to the
top of the sky."' 9 Because the Supreme Court has confronted, with
varying results, each of these concepts, this Note focuses on
horizontal severance, on which the Court's stance is predominantly
uncertain." "Horizontal severance" entails segmenting a fee simple
into smaller parcels. Horizontal lines, essentially lines on a map,
divide a whole parcel. The resulting, adjacent parcels align side-by-
side, unlike, for example, vertically severed parcels which stack up on
top of each other. For example, loosely speaking, America is
horizontally severed into forty-eight contiguous states.
Deciding which calculation-18/18 or 18/20-to use is known as the
denominator problem.2 Beginning with the economic impact caused
by a regulation, courts can represent the takings analysis with a
fraction. The numerator is the economic harm to a particular parcel
caused by a government regulation. The denominator is the total
unregulated economic value of the relevant parcel against which the
economic harm is compared.' The economic impact of a government
regulation is the takings fraction's quotient. Whereas the numerator
in the takings fraction primarily prompts factual disputes about actual
harm done by a government regulation,2 4 the denominator
additionally presents a pivotal legal issue about the scope of the entire
takings inquiry, on which many takings cases turn.25
17. See Margaret Jane Radin, The Liberal Conception of Property: Cross Currents
in the Jurisprudence of Takings, 88 Colum. L. Rev. 1667, 1676 (1988) (authoring the
term "conceptual severance").
18. See Tedra Fox, Lake Tahoe's Temporary Development Moratorium: Why a
Stitch in Time Should Not Define the Property Interest in a Takings Claim, 28 Ecology
L.Q. 399, 401 n.2 (2001); Marc R. Lisker, Regulatory Takings and the Denominator
Problem, 27 Rutgers LJ. 663, 696-705 (1996).
19. Brown v. United States, 73 F.3d 1100, 1103 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
20. See infra Part I.B.
21. See infra text accompanying note 160.
22. See Michelman, Property, supra note 16, at 1190-93 (setting out the
denominator problem); see also Frank Michelman, Takings, 1987, 88 Colum. L Rev.
1600, 1601 (1988) [hereinafter Michelman, Takings] (suggesting the term "entitlement
chopping"); Radin, supra note 17, at 1676.
23. See Walcek v. United States, 49 Fed. Cl. 248,258-59 (2001).
24. See, eg., Florida Rock Indus. v. United States, 18 F3d 1560, 1564-67 (Fed. Cir.
1994); E. Cape May Assocs. v. Dep't of Envtl. Protection, 777 A.2d 1015, 1031-32
(NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001).
25. See Broadwater Farms Joint Venture v. United States, No. 96-5100, 1997 U.S.
App. LEXIS 19859, at *4 (Fed. Cir. July 31, 1997) ("[A] court's determination of what
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The "pivotal" nature of the denominator problem owes in chief to
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council.26  There, the Court
established that whenever a regulation diminishes all the economic
benefit of property a total taking has occurred, and a property owner
must be compensated. 27 If, however a tiny amount of value remains in
the property, then an owner will not automatically prevail under
Lucas, 8 but will be subject to a less favorable balancing test, as set
forth in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City.29 Because
of Lucas, regulatory takings plaintiffs own a keen incentive to fix their
claims as a total taking. For example, the difference between 18/20
and 18/18 is not merely 10%. Rather, it is the difference between a
claimant's automatic success under Lucas, versus, at best, uncertain
odds under Penn Central. For Palazzolo, the fractional gap likely
represents a difference of more than three million dollars.
The resolution of the denominator problem promises a far-reaching
impact on regulatory takings jurisprudence. In Pennsylvania Coal Co.
v. Mahon, Justice Holmes announced that when a regulation goes
"too far" in diminishing property value, then the regulation has
effected a compensable taking." The "too far" test calls for a
measurement of diminution in value of a claimant's property.3' Yet
often the same economic loss can be represented as a small fraction,
or as a total deprivation, depending on the chosen method of
measurement. Even when the parties do not dispute the actual
economic harm caused by a regulation, different methods of
measurement project such varying appearances of overall economic
impact that the result of Holmes' "too far" test relies entirely upon
the method chosen.
Once in place, the takings fraction enables the broader
constitutional inquiry: whether "[g]overnment [is] forcing some
people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice,
should be borne by the public as a whole."3 Initiated by Justice
constitutes the parcel as a whole ... is critical to the analysis. In fact, the definition of
the parcel often controls the entire takings analysis." (citation omitted)).
26. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992); see infra text accompanying notes 72-86.
27. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015-16.
28. Id. at 1019 n.8. But see infra note 86.
29. 438 U.S. 104, 124-25 (1978); see Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 121 S. Ct. 2448,
2462-65 (2001) (citing the Penn Central balancing test with approval). For mention of
the "less favorable" nature of the balancing test, see District Intown Properties v.
District of Columbia, 198 F.3d 874, 886 (D.C. Cir. 1999), James L. Huffman, Judge
Plager's "Sea Change" in Regulatory Takings Law, 6 Fordham Envtl. L.J. 597, 597
(1995), and Michelman, Takings, 1987, supra note 22, at 1621-22.
30. 260 U.S. 393,415 (1922).
31. See William Michael Treanor, Jam for Justice Holmes: Reassessing the
Significance of Mahon, 86 Geo. L. J. 813, 823 (1998) [hereinafter Treanor, Jam for
Justice Holmes].
32. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960); see William Michael
Treanor, The Armstrong Principle, The Narratives of Takings, and Compensation
Statutes, 38 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1151 (1997) [hereinafter Treanor, Armstrong].
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Black, this statement is known as the Armstrong principle, and has
served as a focal point of regulatory takings law since 1960.- In
regulatory takings jurisprudence, unlike with traditional, physical
takings, the mere character of the government action does not
automatically determine whether government has unconstitutionally
taken private property for public use without just compensation,'
Rather, fairness ultimately guides the constitutional scrutiny of
regulatory actions."
Fairness in regulatory takings requires a balancing of competing
interests. On the one hand, the individual has an interest in the use
and enjoyment of his private property, or in the monetary equivalent
when that use and enjoyment is taken. On the other hand, society has
an interest in public improvement, and thus in the use of property as it
impacts health, safety, and welfare. The Armstrong principle
incorporates a balance of these interests.
The denominator problem is a legal precursor to the ultimate
question of fairness embodied in the Armstrong principle. A sensible
approach to the denominator problem must anticipate the subsequent
fairness question, and must not hastily eliminate facts in the name of
denominator analysis that are necessary to later answer the fairness
question, before that question ever gets asked. The approach must
preserve every consideration that is necessary to balance the interests
of the individual with the interests of society. To preserve a fair
balance, any resolution of the denominator problem must use a
method of measurement that: (1) does not distinguish between
takings claimants arbitrarily; and (2) limits the ability of claimants to
unreasonably manipulate the denominator to gain compensation. 6
Those approaches that limit arbitrariness and plaintiff manipulation
will not suffice, however, without adequately accounting for the
benefits created by a regulation. This Note creates a "benefits
fraction" to measure benefits created by government regulationsTM
Unlike the takings fraction, which measures harm, the benefits
fraction reflects the benefit to one parcel caused by the use of another
parcel. Whereas a narrow takings focus, such as that inherent in each
horizontal severance approach, gives the appearance that a regulation
causes a disproportionate amount of harm to an individual, a broad
focus gives the appearance that a regulation causes a disproportionate
amount of benefit to the public. When government is permitted to
33. See Treanor, Armstong, supra note 32, at 1153, nn.15-22.
34. U.S. Const. amend. V ("[Nior shall private property be taken for public use,
without just compensation."); cf. hifra note 67 and accompanying text (outlining
dispositive nature of the character of the government action regarding physical
takings).
35. See William A. Fischel, The Economics of Zoning Laws 51, 151 (1985)
[hereinafter Fischel, Zoning]; infra Part III.C.
36. See infra notes 167-36 and accompanying text.
37. See infra Part III.B.
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broaden the scope of the benefits fraction, the positive impact on
society of a regulation always will appear far greater than the negative
impact on the individual.
To illustrate the inverse relationship between the takings fraction
and the benefits fraction, this Note introduces "numerator theory."
When the scope of the takings denominator shrinks, the scope of the
benefits numerator expands. Numerator theory proposes that by
deviating from the fee simple, horizontal severance permits
government to expand the scope of the benefits fraction.3 8 Revealing
this flaw in horizontal severance, numerator theory emphasizes the
necessity of fairly balancing the government's interest in regulating for
the broadest public benefit. Only the fee simple approach offers a
compromise between focusing too narrowly on the parcel harmed,
and too broadly on the parcels benefited. Identifying this
compromise, this Note advances that only the fee simple approach
successfully preserves a fair inquiry into the constitutionality of
society's effort to regulate land use.39
Part I traces the Supreme Court's treatment of regulatory takings.
First, it describes the two avenues available to takings claimants, per
se takings and, alternatively, the Penn Central balancing test.40
Second, this part examines the Supreme Court's specific treatment of
the denominator problem.41 The Court's stance has wavered since the
seminal case of Pennsylvania Coal. Part I assembles the Court's
brushes with conceptual severance into two groups: cases in which the
Court rejected conceptual severance; and cases in which the Court
accepted conceptual severance. This part pays special attention to the
variance between the Court's treatment of horizontal severance as
opposed to other types of conceptual severance.
Part II surveys the approaches to horizontal severance used by
courts or proposed by scholars. These approaches span a continuum
based on their sensitivity to the polar interests of the public and the
private individual. This part begins at the public-regarding end of the
continuum, setting out the common ownership approach articulated
by the New York Court of Appeals in Penn Central Transportation
Co. v. New York City.42 Part II proceeds through the fee simple
approach,43 then to three alternative versions of horizontal severance:
Justice Scalia's historically cognizable property rights approach;44 the
subjective multifactor approach;45 and the economic substantiality
38. See infra Part III.B.
39. See infra Part III.C.
40. See infra Part I.A.
41. See infra Part I.B.
42. 366 N.E.2d 1271 (N.Y. 1977), affd 438 U.S. 104 (1978); see infra Part II.A.
43. See infra Part II.B.
44. See infra Part II.C.
45. See infra Part II.D.
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approach.4 Advancing that virtually every infringement on private
property is a taking, the libertarian approach defines the continuum's
opposite extreme.47 Each approach is explained and considered in
light of two critical questions noted above: Does the approach permit
takings claimants to manipulate the denominator without limit? Does
the approach distinguish between takings claimants arbitrarily?
Part III criticizes the six approaches. Failing to navigate between
the arbitrariness and manipulation criticisms, the common ownership
and libertarian approaches are eliminated as extreme alternatives.'
This part next explains the benefits fraction,4 9 and applies the fraction
to criticize the remaining approaches.' Part III describes the
relationship between a conceptually severed denominator in the
takings fraction and a conceptually broadened numerator in the
benefits fraction. A comparison of the fractions reveals that
horizontal severance fails to balance the individual's conception of
property with that of the public. Finally, this part examines the fee
simple approach.51 The fee simple adequately responds to the benefits
fraction, and facilitates the broader constitutional inquiry into
whether an individual has been fairly burdened by a regulation that
advances the public good.
I. SUPREME COURT TREATMENT OF REGULATORY TAKINGS
The Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause prevents government from
taking private property for public use without just compensation.,
Traditional takings disputes involve physical seizure of property,' and
in enacting the Takings Clause, the Framers intended to protect
landowners from physical seizures.'
Regulatory actions that impact land use, however, do not fit the
traditional takings prototype. Regulations enacted under the police
power, to further public health, safety, and general welfare, often
46. See infra Part II.E.
47. See infra Part II.F.
48. See infra Part III.A.
49. See infra Part III.B.1.
50. See infra Parts III.B.2., III.B.3, III.B.4.
51. See infra Part III.C.
52. U.S. Const. amend. V.
53. See, e.g., Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 432
(1982) (affirming that "any permanent physical occupation is a taking"); Transp. Co.
v. Chicago, 99 U.S. 635, 642 (1878); see also Michelman, Property, supra note 16, at
1184-90.
54. See William Michael Treanor, The Original Understanding of the Takings
Clause and the Political Process, 95 Colum. L. Rev. 782, 782 (1995) [hereinafter
Treanor, Takings Clause] ("The original understanding of the Takings Clause... was
clear on two points. The clause required compensation when the federal government
physically took private property, but not when government regulations limited the
ways in which property could be used.").
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adversely affect the rights of property owners.5 In 1922, the Supreme
Court recognized a non-physical, regulatory taking in Pennsylvania
Coal Co. v. Mahon.6 The Court, per Justice Holmes, found that when
a state regulation effectively goes "too far" in diminishing property
value "it will be recognized as a taking."57
This part describes the regulatory takings jurisprudence that has
developed in the wake of Pennsylvania Coal's famous decision.
Section A travels the two roads paved by the Court for challenging
government actions under the Takings Clause: (1) that the action
automatically, per se, requires compensation; and (2) that a balance of
factors fairly weighs in favor of compensation. The resolution of the
denominator problem directly influences which of these two roads will
be available to a takings claimant. Section B focuses on the Court's
treatment of the denominator problem, which has changed both over
time, and from one severing concept to the next.
A. Per Se Takings and the Penn Central Balancing Test
Property owners bringing takings claims seek compensation in one
of two ways. When a government action effects a categorical, per se
taking, government must reimburse the property owner for the value
lost because of the action. The Supreme Court has established three
categories of per se takings. First, when government permanently,
physically invades private property, the invasion constitutes a per se
taking.58  Building a highway across a landowner's property, for
example, per se requires compensation. Second, a temporary taking
per se requires compensation. 9 As detailed below, the scope of the
temporary takings category is limited to those instances where the
claimant has already proved a compensable physical or regulatory
taking. The per se part of the temporary takings category applies
when the government action has ended. A takings claimant will
prevail, per se, even when the action has ended. Third, when a private
property owner suffers a total economic loss under a regulation,
government must compensate that loss, per se.6° The only exception
to this rule is that government need not pay a private individual when
it regulates a common law nuisance. When a takings claim fits into
any of the three per se categories, the claimant evades the arguments
in favor of imposing the regulation without compensation. Per se
55. See, e.g., Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 487-
88 (1987); Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926) (zoning laws
held constitutional without compensation); Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394
(1915) (upholding ordinance closing plaintiffs brickyard under police power).
56. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
57. Id. at 415.
58. See infra Part I.A.1.
59. See infra Part I.A.2.
60. See infra Part I.A.3.
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takings do not include a fair balance of interests; compensation is
automatically required.
When a regulation does not effect a per se taking, the claimant must
prevail on a balancing test, articulated in Penn Central Transportation
Co. v. New York City,61 that instructs courts to weigh three factors:
(1) "the economic impact of the regulation"; (2) the property owner's
"investment-backed expectations"; and (3) "the character of the
government action." 6 These factors serve to weigh the interests of
the individual against the interests of the public.63
1. Physical Seizure
A permanent physical occupation of property is a taking. 4 A public
easement, for example, constitutes a compensable taking.61
Permanent physical occupations deprive a property owner of the
essential rights to "possess, use and dispose" of property, and the
Framers had precisely physical seizures in mind in drafting the
Takings Clause.66 As physical seizures equal per se takings, neither
the magnitude of the physical invasion, nor any considerations of
fairness factors in the analysis. In such cases, the character of the
government action acts not as a weight in the balance, but as the lone
criterion. 67
61. 438 U.S. 104 (1978); see Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 121 S. Ct. 2448, 2452-57
(2001) (citing with approval the Penn Central balancing test).
62. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124; see infra Part I.A.4.
63. See Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 123-24; infra Part III.C.
64. See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 426
(1982).
65. See, e.g., Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825,831 (1987) (finding that
the California Coastal Commission physically invaded plaintiff's property when it
exacted a right of public access to plaintiff's beach). Citing Loretto, the Court
declared that the "right to exclude others is one of the most essential sticks in the
bundle of rights that are commonly characterized as property." Id. (internal
quotations omitted). The Court further explained: "We think a 'permanent physical
occupation' has occurred, for purposes of that rule, where individuals are given a
permanent and continuous right to pass to and fro, so that the real property may
continuously be traversed, even though no particular individual is permitted to station
himself permanently upon the premises." Id. at 832; see also Tahoe-Sierra
Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 216 F.3d 764, 775 n.14
(9th Cir. 2000), cert. granted, 121 S. Ct. 2589 (2001).
66. See Loretto, 458 U.S. at 435; Richard A. Epstein, Takings: Private Property
and the Power of Eminent Domain 60, 304 (1985) [hereinafter Epstein, Takings]
("Possession, use... , and disposition form the outer limits of ownership .... [Tihey
lie at the core of a comprehensive and coherent idea of ownership."). But see Radin,
supra note 17, at 1667-70 (reminding that emphasis on possession, use and
disposition-the "liberal triad"-reflects only the liberal conception of property). On
the original understanding of takings as physical seizures, see Treanor, Takings
Clause, supra note 54, at 782.
67. "[W]hen the physical intrusion reaches the extreme form of a permanent
physical occupation ... the character of the government action not only is an
important factor in resolving whether the action works a taking but also is




A temporary taking that denies all use of property entitles a
landowner to compensation.68 Once a court determines that a
property owner has suffered a taking, "no subsequent action by the
government can relieve it of the duty to provide compensation for the
period during which the taking was effective."'69 The thrust behind the
temporary takings category is that temporary takings "are not
different in kind from permanent takings."70  Temporary takings
analysis does not address the initial question of whether a taking has
occurred; merely, it provides that if a property owner would otherwise
prevail on a takings claim, either under another per se rule or under
the balancing test, then the property owner will not fail solely because
the government action is not permanent.7" In other words, if a court
determines that a property owner has suffered a taking, then even
when the government has ceased its invasion, the temporary action
per se requires compensation.
3. Total Takings
A regulation that denies "all economically beneficial or productive
use of land" creates a per se compensable taking.2 This category of
per se takings, in great part, raises the stakes in the denominator
analysis, enough to spawn a great deal of literature, both critical and
supportive.73
68. See First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482
U.S. 304, 306-07 (1987).
69. Id. at 321.
70. Id. at 318.
71. The temporary takings issue in First English thus presented a "remedial"
issue. See First English, 482 U.S. at 311; Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe
Reg'l Planning Agency, 216 F.3d 764, 778 (9th Cir. 2000) ("Because the question
presented to the Supreme Court [in First English] related only to the remedy
available once a taking had been proven, the Court stated explicitly that it was not
addressing whether the ordinance constituted a taking." (citation omitted)), cert.
granted, 121 S. Ct. 2589 (2001); Linda Greenhouse, A Property-Rights Claim Meets
Resistance, N.Y. Times, Jan. 8, 2002, at A16. For the contrary view that courts must
first temporally sever property and second determine the regulation's (or
moratorium's) impact on that slice in time, see Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council,
Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 228 F.3d 998, 999-1003 (9th Cir. 2000)
(Kozinski, J., dissenting from denial of petition for rehearing).
72. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015 (1992). Of the per se
categories, Lucas most influences the denominator problem.
73. "Today the Court launches a missile to kill a mouse." Id. at 1036 (Blackmun,
J., dissenting). Commentary on Lucas is extensive. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein,
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council: A Tangled Web of Expectations, 45 Stan. L.
Rev. 1369 (1993) [hereinafter Epstein, Symposium]; R.S. Radford & J. David
Breemer, Great Expectations: Will Palazzolo v. Rhode Island Clarify the Murky
Doctrine of Investment-Backed Expectations In Regulatory Takings Law?, 9 N.Y.U.
Envtl. L.J. 449,478-511 (2001).
1966 [Vol. 70
REGULATORY TAKINGS LAW
When South Carolina voted in 1988 to protect its coastline, the
value of David Lucas's two beachfront lots dropped from
$1,232,387.50 to $0.74 The Beachfront Management Act prevented
Lucas from erecting any structures on his property, contrary to his
intention to build single-family homes on the parcels."s The Supreme
Court, per Justice Scalia, ruled against South Carolina on the ground
that Lucas suffered a categorical taking 6 Justice Scalia unwound a
string of prior cases to sew the rule that denial of all economically
viable use of a fee simple violates the Fifth Amendment. 7
The Court advanced three justifications for the Lucas rule.78 First,
"from the landowner's point of view, [total economic loss is] the
equivalent of a physical appropriation."7 Second, the government's
ability to exercise the police power withstands the Lucas rule virtually
unharmed, because occasions of total economic loss of a fee simple
are "relatively rare."' Third, the rule guards against instances where
the government, in fact, aims not to promote health, safety, and
welfare, but rather to dedicate private property for public service
without paying for it.81
When a takings plaintiff satisfies a Lucas claim, courts will not
balance any other factors; the government simply will lose. 2
74. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1007-09. The Court accepted that the coastal regulation
took all the value of Lucas's land, but four justices expressed skepticism about such an
unlikely outcome. See id. at 1034 (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("This [complete
devaluation] is a curious finding, and I share the reservations... about a finding that
a beachfront lot loses all value because of a development restriction."); id. at 1044
(Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("This finding [of complete devaluation] is almost certainly
erroneous. Petitioner still can enjoy other attributes of ownership, such as the right to
exclude others.. .. "); id. at 1065 n.3 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("[H]is land is far from
'valueless."'); id. at 1076 (Souter, J., statement). William Fischel's closer look at
Lucas's property later revealed, however, that even the minimal, residual value
presumed by the four justices was not present. See William A. Fischel, Regulatory
Takings: Law, Economics, and Politics 59-61 (1995) [hereinafter Fischel, Regulatory
Takings]. David Lucas, thoroughly unlike any other takings claimant, lost everything.
Id at 60.
75. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1007.
76. See id. at 1019.
77. Justice Scalia cited Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980), Nollan v.
California Coastal Commission, 483 U.S. 825, 834 (1987), Keystone Bituminous Coal
Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 495 (1987), and Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining
& Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 295-96 (1981), as the sources for the categorical
Lucas holding. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015-16.
78. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1017-18; see also id. at 1066-67 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
79. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1017.
80. Id. at 1018.
81. Id
82. See Palm Beach Isles Assocs. v. United States, 231 F.3d 1354, 1361 (Fed. Cir.
2000) (denial of petition for rehearing en banc) ("Lucas teaches that the economic
impact factor alone may be determinative; in some circumstances, no balancing of
factors is required."). But see Palm Beach Isles Assocs. v. United States, 231 F.3d
1365,1367 (Gajarsa, J., dissenting from denial of petition for rehearing) ("Investment-
backed expectations must be considered in all regulatory takings cases, even in those
rare situations where the government has deprived a landowner of all economically
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However, the Court carved out one exception to the rule. The
government can affirmatively defend that its regulation merely
prohibits a common law nuisance, grounded in the "background
principles of the State's law of property." 3 Justice Scalia articulated
the exception as follows:
Where the State seeks to sustain regulation that deprives land of all
economically beneficial use, we think it may resist compensation
only if the logically antecedent inquiry into the nature of the owner's
estate shows that the proscribed use interests were not part of his
title to begin with. This accords, we think, with our "takings"
jurisprudence, which has traditionally been guided by the
understandings of our citizens regarding the content of, and the
State's power over, the "bundle of rights" that they acquire when
they obtain title to property. 84
Justice Scalia illustrated the exception at work, assuring that the
government can prevent the owner of a lakebed from flooding the
land of his neighbors, and the owner of a nuclear plant from operating
atop a fault line, even when such action would deprive the owners,
respectively, of all the economic value of their land.'
Lucas increased the incentive for property owners to frame their
harm as total economic loss. A landowner who suffers a 100% loss
will succeed on a takings claim, provided that the operative regulation
finds its source outside nuisance law. Another landowner who suffers
a 95% loss in economically productive use, however, or a 99% loss,
will not gain the benefit of the per se rule.86
For example, consider Palazzolo, to whom I will refer in
illustrations as ,p." P owns twenty acres of land, eighteen of which
are coastal wetlands.' P plans to develop his property, but is denied a
permit to fill in the wetlands acres. After Lucas, P realizes a gap
between illustrating his loss as 18/20 versus 18/18. The difference
between losing some economic value of all of the parcel and losing all
economic value of some of the parcel is no longer just 10%. Instead, it
is the difference between a court finding a categorical taking and a
court subjecting P's claim to Penn Central's ad hoc, all-encompassing
balancing test.
beneficial use.").
83. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1029.
84. Id. at 1027 (footnote omitted).
85. Id. at 1029.
86. See id. at 1064-65 (Stevens, J., dissenting). But see Palazzolo v. Rhode Island,
121 S. Ct. 2448, 2464 (2001) ("[A] State may not evade the duty to compensate on the
premise that the landowner is left with a token interest."). This dictum demonstrates
the slipperiness of the Lucas slope; nowhere in Lucas did the Court indicate that less
than a total taking would merit per se compensation.
87. See supra notes 1-16 and accompanying text.




4. The Balancing Test
A regulation that does not effect a categorical taking comes under
the scrutiny of a three-part balancing test. Courts consider (1) "[t]he
economic impact of the regulation on the claimant," (2) the property
owner's reasonable "investment-backed expectations," and (3) "the
character of the governmental action."' The Court set out this three-
factor analysis in Penn Central. There, the Court, per Justice
Brennan, eschewed any "set formula" in takings jurisprudence.' The
Court called for "ad hoc, factual inquiries" into takings cases
generally, and applied such an approach to the case at hand, as it
closely compared New York City's interest in preserving its historic
landmarks, with Penn Central's interest in realizing the development
potential of the airspace above Grand Central Station.'
Penn Central concerned New York City's Landmarks Preservation
Law, and its economic effect on Grand Central Terminal." Having
designated Grand Central Terminal a landmark, New York City's
Landmarks Preservation Commission denied petitioner Penn
Central's applications to build an office tower on top of the terminal.9
The Commission reasoned that "[l]andmarks cannot be divorced from
their settings -particularly when the setting is a dramatic and integral
part of the original concept."'  The denial did not destroy Penn
Central's "air rights" above the terminal, however. Rather, the
Commission permitted Penn Central to transfer those air rights to
other property it held in the city.95 Dissatisfied with the trade, Penn
Central brought a takings challenge for the lost airspace above Grand
Central Station. The Court responded with the three-part balancing
test, which Penn Central ultimately failed.
The first factor, the economic impact on the claimant, calls on the
parties to calculate the economic value of the property when
regulated versus the economic value when unregulated. While 100%
devaluation mandates compensation under Lucas, smaller, yet still
compelling losses often fail to sway the takings balance in claimants'
89. Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
90. Id. Justice Brennan stated that
[T]his Court, quite simply, has been unable to develop any "set formula" for
determining when "justice and fairness" require that economic injuries
caused by public action be compensated by the government, rather than
remain disproportionately concentrated on a few persons. Indeed, we have
frequently observed that whether a particular restriction will be rendered
invalid by the government's failure to pay for any losses proximately caused
by it depends largely "upon the particular circumstances [in that] case."
Id (alteration in original) (citations omitted).
91. Id
92. See id at 108-09.
93. Id. at 117.
94. Id. at 118.
95. Id at 114, 120, 137.
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favor.96 The reason is that Penn Central's remaining factors often
enable the government to overcome even a substantial diminution in
value.97
The second factor, reasonable investment-backed expectations,
focuses on the property itself, and the property owner's expectations
for that property.98 When a regulation interferes with interests that
inhere in a claimant's title, the second factor balances against the
government, provided that the claimant can demonstrate some pre-
regulation intent to exercise those interests.99 Unlike the economic
impact factor, fairness underlies the expectations inquiry.10 For
example, in Penn Central the title holders expected to build a fifty-
five-story addition on top of Grand Central Station.' In Lucas,
Lucas expected to build beach houses on his two beachfront lots."
The analysis under the second factor entails determining whether the
property owner reasonably could have expected to use the property in
a way that the regulation now prevents.
This factor recently came to the takings forefront in Palazzolo."3
Palazzolo obtained title to his predominantly wetlands parcel after
Rhode Island enacted the Coastal Resources Management Council
96. See, e.g., Concrete Pipe & Prods. of Cal., Inc. v. Constr. Laborers Pension
Trust, 508 U.S. 602, 645 (1993) (finding 46% diminution in value "insufficient to
demonstrate a taking"); Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 384,
390 (1926) (holding 75% diminution caused by recently enacted zoning program not a
taking); Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394, 405 (1915) (upholding 92.5%
diminution without compensation when plaintiff forced to close down brickyard). In
Euclid and Hadacheck, however, the disputed ordinances each dealt with a nuisance.
Consequently, even had the regulations destroyed 100% of the property owner's
value in either case, presumably no compensation would have been required under
today's standards. Euclid's famous 75% high water mark for diminution in value,
thus, represents an inapposite measure for cases where the regulation aims at some
harm other than a nuisance. See also Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003,
1064 (1992) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("A landowner whose property is diminished in
value 95% recovers nothing, while an owner whose property is diminished 100%
recovers the land's full value.").
97. See, e.g., Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning
Agency, 216 F.3d 764, 773 (9th Cir. 2000), cert. granted, 121 S. Ct. 2589 (2001). There,
plaintiffs conceded that because of the government's compelling interest in preserving
Lake Tahoe, they could succeed on a takings claim only under Lucas. Id. In other
words, the Tahoe plaintiffs proceeded under the assumption that they could prove a
total taking (of a slice in time), but that they nonetheless could not prove a favorable
balance under Penn Central. See also Huffman, supra note 29, at 602 ("There is no
reason that the [Penn Central] balance will favor the claimant in every case when
there is a total loss of economic value.").
98. See Michelman, Property, supra note 16, at 1229-34.
99. See id.
100. See Palm Beach Isles Assocs. v. United States, 231 F.3d 1365, 1369 (Fed. Cir.
2000) (Gajarsa, J., dissenting from denial of petition for rehearing) ("[Ijnvestment-
backed expectations analysis looks not to 'how much' is taken, but rather at fairness
and reliance interests." (citing Michelman, Property, supra note 16, at 1231-33)).
101. See Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104,116-17 (1978).
102. See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1008 (1992).
103. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 121 S. Ct. 2448,2462 (2001).
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("CRMC") enabling act."1 ' The Rhode Island Supreme Court ruled
that because the regulation came into place before Palazzolo obtained
the property, he could not reasonably expect to develop the wetlands
acres. 5 The timing rendered the second factor determinative of the
entire case in Rhode Island's favor.' 6 The United States Supreme
Court reversed, holding that a state does not shape property rights
merely by creating laws that impact land use. 7 Thus, a post-
regulation land transfer does not foreclose a takings claim.'3
Concurring, Justice O'Connor instructed the Rhode Island court on
remand to weigh the relative timing of Palazzolo's land acquisition
under the second Penn Central factor, but not to categorically rule
against Palazzolo on that fact alone."19
The third factor, the character of the government action, implies
one or all of three inquiries. First, some courts observe whether the
regulatory action acts like a physical invasion.110 Second, other courts
determine "whether the regulation has a legitimate public purpose."'' 1
Third, still other courts address the character of the government
action more broadly, inquiring into the purposes of the regulation and
the degree to which it impacts one property owner more than
others.112  The Supreme Court has addressed the first two factors
sufficiently to provide guidance as to the meaning of each, but has not
explained the precise aim of the third factor. Notwithstanding the
varying interpretations of the character of the government action, and,
apart from instances of physical invasion, the third factor typically
favors the government.
Applying the balancing test, the Penn Central Court ruled for New
York City. On the second and third factors, the Court emphasized
that the regulation did not interfere with any current uses and that
landmark preservation is an accepted, common practice.1 3 On the
first factor, the Court found that the regulation permitted Penn
104. See id at 2462.
105. See id.
106. Palazzolo v. State ex rel Tavares, 746 A.2d 707,717 (R.I. 2000), rev'd sub nom.
Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 121 S. Ct. 2448 (2001).
107. See Palazzolo, 121 S. Ct. at 2462-64.
108. See id
109. See id. at 2465-67 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
110. See, eg., Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987); Loretto v.
Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
111. District Intown Properties v. District of Columbia, 198 F3d 874,879 (D.C. Cir.
1999) (citing Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 485
(1987)); see Brace v. United States, 48 Fed. Cl. 272, 278-79 (2000).
112 See, e.g., Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 28 F.3d 1171, 1177 (Fed.
Cir. 1994); Brace, 48 Fed. Cl. at 278-79. But see Forest Properties, Inc. v. United
States, 177 F.3d 1360, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (finding the character of the government
action irrelevant because the relevant permit was not denied pursuant to a nuisance).




Central to obtain a "reasonable return" on its investment.1 4 It also
found that value remained in Grand Central Station's airspace,
because the historic landmark regulation permitted Penn Central to
transfer air rights from Grand Central Terminal to its neighboring
property, thereby permitting Penn Central to build higher in places
where it was not otherwise permitted."' Finally, in an oft-quoted
section of the opinion, Justice Brennan flatly rejected Penn Central's
argument that its air rights should be vertically severed from the
remainder of the fee simple. 6 Though the Court's rejection was
explicit, the argument for conceptual severance has returned to the
Court more than once, each time drawing a new response.
B. Supreme Court Treatment of the Denominator Problem
The Court has not reached a definitive position on the denominator
problem. In the cases where the Court has expressly ruled on the
problem the results have varied, and appear at odds with each other,
at least philosophically. In other takings cases where the Court has
not expressly addressed the denominator problem, the Court's ruling
nonetheless implies a stance. Often, ruling for the property holder
implies that at least the concept at issue is severable, and ruling for the
government implies that it is not. In still other takings cases when
conceptual severance is not at issue, the Court has commented on the
denominator problem in dicta.
Two variables influence the Court's stance on conceptual severance.
The first is simply the passage of time. The Court's view changes over
time, as new justices cast different votes on the same problem. For
example, the Court has ruled twice on the severability of mining, or
support rights: once for the property owner, once sixty-five years later
for the government. 117 The second variable influencing the Court's
solution of the denominator problem is the concept at issue. Some
concepts sever property, others do not. For example, within four
months in 1987 the Court confronted conceptual severance three
times. In Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis,n s First
English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles," 9 and
Nollan v. California Coastal Commission,20  the government
regulation affected mining support rights, temporary development,
114. Id. at 136.
115. See id. at 137 ("Their ability to use these [air] rights has not been abrogated;
they are made transferable to at least eight parcels in the vicinity of the Terminal, one
or two of which have been found suitable for the construction of new office
buildings.").
116. See id. at 130-31; infra text accompanying note 127.
117. See Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922); Keystone
Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987).
118. 480 U.S. 470 (1987).
119. 482 U.S. 304 (1987).
120. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
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and the right to exclude, respectively."' None of the claimants had
suffered a total loss; each complained of a partial loss that should be
evaluated apart from the value remaining in the fee simple. t " Ruling
twice for the property owner and once for the government, the Court
severed the slice in time and the right to exclude, and rejected the
argument for severing support rights from the fee simple.'2
Although ultimately this Note is concerned with horizontal
severance, the Court's comments on the denominator problem do not
fit neatly into boxes of severing concepts. Often when confronted
with a specific concept, such as vertical severance, the Court uses
general language that seems to apply not only to vertical severance,
but to every potential severing concept. The overview below thus
includes all types of conceptual severance, and identifies the particular
concepts on which the Court has ruled, even when the Court's
language implies a general application to the denominator problem.
This part assembles the Court's treatment of the denominator
problem in three groups. First, it reviews those instances where the
Court has rejected conceptual severance. Then it reviews the Court's
intermittent acceptance of conceptual severance. This section finishes
by assessing where the Court currently stands on conceptual
severance, and where it seems headed.
1. Conceptual Severance Rejected
In 1978, the Supreme Court expressly rejected conceptual severance
in Penn Central.124 Penn Central argued that the airspace over Grand
Central Station should comprise the relevant stick against which to
compare the regulation's harm."2 This argument implicated vertical
severance, as Penn Central asked the Court to observe the profile of
its city block and declare the loss of a particular height taken.'2
Responding to Penn Central's argument, Justice Brennan squarely
rejected conceptual severance:
"Taking" jurisprudence does not divide a single parcel into discrete
segments and attempt to determine whether rights in a particular
segment have been entirely abrogated. In deciding whether a
particular governmental action has effected a taking, this Court
focuses rather both on the character of the action and on the nature
and extent of the interference with rights in the parcel as a whole-
here, the city tax block designated as the "landmark site."1 7
121. See infra Parts I.B.1., I.B.2.
122. See infra Parts I.B.1., I.B.2.
123. See infra Parts I.B.1., I.B.2.






Although Penn Central's argument presented vertical severance, the
Court's rejection made no distinction between vertical and any other
conceptual severance. After Penn Central, conceptual severance
seemed without support.
Citing Penn Central's disapproval of conceptual severance, the
Court rejected the argument for severing mining support rights in
Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis." Interestingly, the
Court turned away virtually the same severance argument that it had
accepted six decades earlier in Pennsylvania Coal.'29 Whereas Justice
Holmes emphasized that the Pennsylvania Coal Company had lost all
of its support rights, Justice Stevens characterized Keystone's nearly
identical loss as "one strand of the bundle." 3' With Keystone's
vertical severance tactic behind them, the Court ruled that enough
coal remained available after Pennsylvania's Subsidence Act to
overcome Keystone's taking challenge. 131
The Court also rejected an effort to sever personal property in 1993,
in Concrete Pipe & Products of California, Inc. v. Construction
Laborers Pension Trust.32 Concrete Pipe argued for conceptually
severing pension funds owed under ERISA. In response, the Court
stated: "To the extent that any portion of property is taken, that
portion is always taken in its entirety; the relevant question, however,
is whether the property taken is all, or only a portion of, the parcel in
question."' 3
2. Conceptual Severance Accepted
Ruling for the Pennsylvania Coal Company in 1922, Justice
Holmes' majority not only explicitly legitimized regulatory takings
claims, but it implicitly legitimized conceptual severance.14 In
Pennsylvania Coal, the Court considered three property rights stacked
on top of each other in a fee simple: subsurface rights; support rights;
and surface rights. Support rights, though only a vertical segment of
any fee simple, were recognized in Pennsylvania at the time.
Professor Carol Rose explained Pennsylvania's historical recognition
of support rights:
128. 480 U.S. 470 (1987).
129. For the majority, Justice Stevens advanced several arguments to distinguish
the case from Pennsylvania Coal. Id. at 481-93; see infra Part I.B.2.
130. Id. at 497.
131. See id. at 498.
132. 508 U.S. 602 (1993).
133. Id. at 644 (citing Keystone, 480 U.S. at 497). The Court also rejected
severance in the context of personal property in Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 64-68
(1979) (finding a regulation that prevented selling eagle feathers not compensable,
but merely a "destruction of one strand of the bundle").
134. See Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
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Pennsylvania common law recognized three separate "estates" in
mining property: first, an estate in the surface, second, an estate in
the minerals below, and finally, an estate in the support of the
surface (the third estate). The third estate arose from the miners'
common law duty to support the surface under which they mined, a
duty which could be released through agreement with the surface
owner. 
135
Initially possessing all of these rights, the Coal Company deeded
surface rights to potential homeowners, but reserved the support
rights for the purpose of mining.136 Pennsylvania enacted the Kohler
Act, which prohibited mining coal in such a way as to cause residences
above ground to subside. 37 The Kohler Act effectively took the
supporting coal from the subsurface owners, and gave it to the surface
owners. Pennsylvania Coal brought suit to regain these support
rights.
The Court responded with the "too far" test, which continues to
echo in takings law."3 Implicit in the Court's holding was a
willingness to assess the Kohler Act's impact on support rights, apart
from the remainder of subsurface rights.139 The Court's analysis thus
incorporated conceptual severance.
In dissent, Justice Brandeis criticized this tactic:
[V]alues are relative. If we are to consider the value of the coal kept
in place by the restriction, we should compare it with the value of all
other parts of the land. That is, with the value not of the coal alone,
but with the value of the whole property. The rights of an owner as
against the public are not increased by dividing the interests in his
135. Carol M. Rose, Mahon Reconstructed: Why the Takings Issue Is Still a
Muddle, 57 S. Cal. L. Rev. 561,563 (1984) (footnotes omitted).
136. Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 412; Fischel, Regulatory Takings, supra note
74, at 15; Rose, supra note 135, at 564; see infra notes 206-09 and accompanying text.
137. Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 412; Fischel, Regulatory Takings, supra note
74, at 15; Rose, supra note 135, at 563.
138. See supra notes 31-34 and accompanying text; see also, e.g., Lucas v. S.C.
Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003,1014 (1992).
139. See Richard A. Epstein, Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon: The Erratic Takings
Jurisprudence of Justice Holmes, 86 Geo. L.J. 875, 898-99 (1998) [hereinafter Epstein,
Erratic Takings Jurisprudence] ("Holmes's view of the subject seems to be that the
inability to mine the coal in the support pillars was a total loss of that limited amount
of property: the ratio of numerator to denominator is thus one to one."). But see
Fischel, Regulatory Takings, supra note 74, at 49 ("Holmes was not anywhere in his
opinion arguing that if one stick in the bundle of property is extinguished that fact
alone makes it a taking."); Radin, supra note 17, at 1677 ("In [Pennsylvania Coal],
legislation that de facto prevented coal mining 'took' a coal company's mining rights,
but mining rights were all that the company owned...."). The dispute over whether
Justice Holmes, in fact, conceptually severed support rights is not merely academic. If
he did not, then Pennsylvania Coal rested on a rare, favorable (anachronistic)
application of Penn Central's balancing test for a property owner.
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property into surface and subsoil. The sum of the rights in the parts
can not be greater than the rights in the whole.
1 40
Justice Brandeis expressed deference to the Legislature's attempt to
protect health and safety. 4 ' Segmenting the fee simple broadened the
reach of the Takings Clause, which ran contrary to Justice Brandeis's
understanding that the police power operates constitutionally when it
applies generally. 14 Holmes's deference, on the other hand, extended
to the landowner, with conceptual severance the consequence.
During the 1980s, the Court embraced conceptual severance in
three unique settings. First, the Court ruled for Jean Loretto, owner
of a Manhattan apartment building, in Loretto v. Teleprompter
Manhattan CATV Corp.43  Loretto demanded compensation in
exchange for compliance with New York Executive Law section 828,
which effectively granted the defendant cable television company the
right to string a cable wire across her property.1 " Loretto claimed that
the cable wire effected a taking. The Court agreed, electing not to
weigh the harm caused by a cable wire against the entire fee simple,
but rather declaring the physical invasion a per se taking.14 For the
majority, Justice Marshall represented that the regulation did not
merely harm one stick in the bundle, rather it "chop[ped] through the
bundle, taking a slice of every strand.' 4 6
Essentially, the Court severed the space occupied by the cable and
used that as the denominator in the takings analysis. 47 According to
Professor Margaret Jane Radin,
Loretto moves away from [Penn Central's] position and toward
conceptual severance. In order to find that placing a cable on a
building "effectively destroys each" of the liberal rights, one must
first decide that one is talking about fee simple absolute not in the
building as a whole, but rather in the space occupied by the cable.148
The entire body of physical takings law rests on the premise that
when government physically appropriates property for public use, the
accompanying loss must be compensated, regardless of the value
140. Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 419 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
141. Id. at 417.
142. Id. at 419. See generally Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1073 (Stevens, J., dissenting);
Treanor, Jam for Justice Holmes, supra note 31, at 855-56.
143. 458 U.S. 419,426 (1982).
144. Id. at423.
145. Id. at 426; see supra notes 64-67 and accompanying text.
146. Loretto, 458 U.S. at 435. Justice Marshall's use of the bundle of sticks
metaphor suggests a two-dimensional model. But if horizontal, vertical, temporal,
and functional present coherent divisions of property, then the bundle of rights must
properly be envisioned in no less than four dimensions. For example, the cable wire
took all of one spatial stick, and one small part of every functional, use stick (the right
to exclude, the right of disposition, etc.).




remaining in the claimant's fee simple. Loretto affirmed that even
when the invasion is minute, an individual's right to own property free
from physical interference enjoys individual consideration. Because
the Supreme Court has unequivocally embraced physical invasion as
distinct, compensable harm in every instance, the body of physical
takings law has developed distinct from regulatory takings.
In First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los
Angeles, the Court likewise engaged in conceptual severance, when it
compared the plaintiff's harm against the value of a slice in time. 4 9
The property owner complained of a loss in development value for a
short period. The lower court ruled that because the taking lasted
only temporarily, First English per se could not prevail on a takings
challenge. 5 ' The Supreme Court reversed, finding that "temporary
takings... are not different in kind from permanent takings."'' Like
the holding in Loretto, the holding in First English rested upon the
assumption that the fee simple can be sliced, and that the resulting
slices suffice as relevant parcels for the denominator. First English
reflects the Court's acceptance of temporal severance.
Finally, the Court severed the right to exclude in Nollan v.
California Coastal Commission.52 There, California made a trade
with the Nollans: the right to build a new beach house in exchange for
public access to the beach. The Court, per Justice Scalia, began with
the premise that "the right to exclude [others is] one of the most
essential sticks in the bundle of rights that are commonly
characterized as property."1 53 Justice Scalia characterized California's
coastal regulation as "extortion,"'" and ruled that "if [California]
wants an easement across the Nollans' property, it must pay for it."' 55
Nollan thus accepted functional severance, finding the right to exclude
a "complete thing taken.' ' 56
149. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S.
304 (1987).
150. See id. at 309.
151. Id. at 318 (internal quotations omitted); see supra text accompanying notes 64-
67.
152. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
153. Id. at 831 (citing Loretto) (alterations in original) (internal quotations
omitted).
154. Id. at 837.
155. Id. at 842.
156. Radin, supra note 17, at 1677-78. Other instances of the Court accepting
conceptual severance include Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979)
(privileging the right to exclude in the context of navigational servitude), and Hodel v.
Irving, 481 U.S. 704 (1987) (finding disposition at death a separable strand from the
bundle of rights). See Radin, supra note 17, at 1672-74, 1678-79.
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3. Conceptual Severance Today
Evaluating the whole of Supreme Court precedent on the
denominator problem, this much is certain. One, when government
physically invades property, the relevant parcel is only the area
physically taken.57 Two, when a regulation violates a property
owner's right to exclude, this harm will not be weighed against the
unregulated value of the fee simple, but only against the value of that
isolated right.15 Three, takings claimants can temporally sever a fee
simple, thereby comparing temporary harm with temporary value. 159
Four, the Court never has accepted horizontal severance.
Four discrete rules notwithstanding, the Court's see-saw treatment
of the denominator problem has left its current stance predominantly
uncertain."6° The Court denounced conceptual severance with respect
to personal property as recently as 1993 in Concrete Pipe.6' But dicta
in Lucas and Palazzolo mitigate Concrete Pipe's seemingly definitive
stance, at least with respect to real property. In footnote seven of
Lucas, Justice Scalia suggested that "[t]he answer to this difficult
question may lie in how the owner's reasonable expectations have
been shaped by the State's law of property."' 62 In Palazzolo, Justice
Kennedy suggested that the denominator problem deserves fresh
consideration, when he stated that the Court has "at times expressed
discomfort with the logic" of using the fee simple as the relevant
parcel for the denominator in the takings fraction. 63
The sum of the Supreme Court's analysis of the denominator
problem, for example, does not avail P of his takings challenge.
Owning eighteen economically devastated wetlands acres, P will liken
his plight to that of Lucas, and will ask the court to find a per se total
157. Supra text accompanying note 147; see Radin, supra note 17, at 1678-79.
158. Supra text accompanying note 156.
159. Supra text accompanying note 151.
160. See Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 121 S. Ct. 2448, 2465 (2001); Constitutional
Law-Regulatory Takings-Federal Circuit's Holding Introduces Subjective Factors
into Takings Clause "Denominator" Analysis, 114 Harv. L. Rev. 926 (2001)
[hereinafter Recent Cases, Regulatory Takings].
161. See supra notes 132-33 and accompanying text.
162. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1016 n.7 (1992); infra text
accompanying note 205.
163. Palazzolo, 121 S. Ct. at 2465. The Court appears poised for a serious look at
horizontal severance. Justice Kennedy cited John Fee's economic substantiality
approach in Palazzolo. Id.; see infra Part II.E. Moreover, the Court's conservative
trend in takings law indicates a readiness to accept horizontal severance, in one form
or another, as it consists with the expanded version of the Takings Clause central to
the conservative viewpoint. See Radin, supra note 17, at 1680-81; infra notes 282-284
and accompanying text. See generally Greenhouse, supra note 71 ("Advocates of
property rights have been on a winning streak at the Supreme Court for the last 15
years or so as the court, by narrow majorities, has expanded the categories of land-use
regulation for which the government must compensate property owners.").
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taking.164 But to frame his economic loss as a total taking, P must
assert that the relevant parcel for the takings equation is not the fee
simple (twenty acres), but rather the eighteen wetlands acres. In
other words, P will attempt to horizontally sever the wetlands from
the fee simple, so that the takings fraction equals 18/18. The regulator
will respond that P's economic loss is not total; instead the takings
fraction equals 18/20. Penn Central and its progeny mandate using the
latter fraction. But several of the approaches detailed below urge
using the former.
II. HORIZONTAL SEVERANCE
Without clear guidance from the Supreme Court, lower courts and
scholars have suggested resolutions for the denominator problem in
the context of horizontal severance. Six approaches have emerged:
(1) common ownership; (2) the fee simple approach; (3) historically
cognizable property rights; (4) multifactor analysis; (5) economic
substantiality; and (6) the libertarian approach. Each approach
suggests where to draw the line on a map so as to define the relevant
parcel in the denominator of the takings fraction. These approaches
arrange along a theoretical continuum. At the far left end of the
continuum resides Justice Holmes's maxim that "[g]overnment hardly
could go on if to some extent values incident to property could not be
diminished without paying for every such change in the general
law."" Approaches that discourage severing property interests tend
toward this end of the continuum. These approaches place a
regulation's impact in the context of all of a claimant's property,
which creates comparatively smaller takings fractions. Producing
smaller takings fractions, these approaches result in a permissive
understanding of government's police power, thereby heeding Justice
Holmes's familiar maxim.
At the far right end of the continuum resides Professor Richard
Epstein's view that "[t]he amount of compensation should always
depend on what is taken from the owner."'I The approaches toward
this end of the continuum result in a constrained understanding of
government's police power, as the shrunken denominators supported
by these approaches project the image of a compensable taking with
comparatively greater regularity. Horizontal severance is employed
with increasingly loose criteria as the continuum progresses toward
Professor Epstein's libertarian view, making more and more
government infringements appear as takings.
If the maxim of Justice Holmes or of Professor Epstein was heeded
without pause, then an accepted legal doctrine would be rendered
164. See supra text accompanying notes 74-88.
165. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393,413 (1922).
166. See Epstein, Erratic Takings Jurispndence, supra note 139, at 899.
2002] 1979
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
meaningless: the Takings Clause in the former case or the police
power in the latter. These polar results underlie the two common
criticisms of horizontal severance approaches: arbitrariness and
manipulation.67 First, an approach that arbitrarily distinguishes
between successful and unsuccessful takings plaintiffs is likely
untenable, because no fair inquiry will turn on happenstance. The
arbitrariness criticism is strongest at the left end of the continuum,
and a proposed strength of approaches nearer the right end of the
continuum is that they avoid arbitrary criteria in refining the takings
denominator. Second, an approach suffers when it permits an
affected property owner to manipulate the denominator in every
instance, such that every government action that impacts private
property will appear as a taking, as, in other words, 1/1. Approaches
nearer the right end of the continuum induce the manipulation
criticism. Moreover, because excessive plaintiff manipulation
threatens to upend government's police power, any acceptable
approach must either answer the manipulation criticism, or admit of a
break with that rooted doctrine."6
A. The Common Ownership Approach
The common ownership approach includes more of a claimant's
holdings in the denominator than any other approach. Under the
common ownership approach, the relevant parcel includes all of a
claimant's holdings in the vicinity of the affected property.'69 Eligible
holdings include property that is not contiguous with the area harmed
by the regulation. In other words, property beyond the fee simple is
relevant to the measurement of a regulation's impact on a claimant
under the common ownership approach.
Before the Supreme Court granted certiorari, the New York Court
of Appeals made its own relevant parcel determination in Penn
167. On arbitrariness, see, e.g., John E. Fee, Unearthing the Denominator in
Regulatory Takings Claims, 61 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1535, 1552 (1994), and Michelman,
Property, supra note 16, at 1234. On manipulation, see, e.g., Radin, supra note 17, at
1677-78, and Rose, supra note 135, at 568.
[C]ontracting the relevant property interest, as Holmes did, may turn every
regulation into a taking. This approach may cause owners to make elaborate
and socially useless splits of their property rights, so that any one property
right affected by a regulation is completely taken, and the courts will have to
reunite the bundle of property rights to determine whether there truly has
been a taking.
Rose, supra note 135, at 568.
168. See Courtney C. Tedrowe, Note, Conceptual Severance and Takings in the
Federal Circuit, 85 Cornell L. Rev. 586, 596 (2000); see generally Lucas v. S. C. Coastal
Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1036-1061 (1992) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (describing how a
swelled conception of the Takings Clause presents an affront to the police power).




Central, articulating the common ownership approach. 7" At the
outset, the court found New York City's goal of landmark
preservation an acceptable purpose.17' In light of the city's acceptable
purpose, Penn Central would prevail only by showing that the
regulation did not permit a "reasonable return" on its investment.In
Whether the owners of Grand Central Terminal retained a reasonable
post-regulatory return invoked a denominator analysis: the
denominator equaled the pre-regulation, potential return on all the
relevant property; the numerator equaled the post-regulation return
on that same property; and the resulting fraction made out the
evidence of "reasonableness," or lack thereof.
The New York Court of Appeals determined that all of Penn
Central's land interests in the vicinity were relevant in the takings
fraction.173 Penn Central's nearby real estate included eight parcels,
including office buildings and the Biltmore and Commodore Hotels.'74
The court found the value of the hotels and other, commonly-owned,
nearby land interests relevant on the issue of reasonable return.,"
The return on these holdings intertwined with the landmark
preservation regulation on the Terminal in two significant ways. First,
the value of the hotels and office buildings depended on the operation
of Grand Central Terminal. 176  Thus, even though Penn Central
complained that the Terminal operated at a loss with the regulation in
place, the additional value of a preserved Terminal to the office
buildings and hotels could be "imputed to the terminal."'" Second,
the landmark preservation regulation did not abolish the development
rights of Grand Central Terminal's air space. Rather, it transferred
those development rights to other parcels in the vicinity, so that Penn
Central could build higher in other places as a result of the
regulation.178 The added value to these commonly owned, "receiving
parcels" tallied toward a finding of reasonable return.' 9
Other courts have not embraced the New York Court of Appeals
approach in Penn Central. Justice Scalia denounced the approach in
footnote seven of Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, calling it
"extreme" and "unsupportable."' Later courts have accepted
Lucas's dictum.' While thoroughly preventing plaintiff manipulation
170. See id.
171. See id. at 1274-75.
172. Id.
173. See id at 1276-77; Rose, supra note 135, at 567-68.
174. Penn Central, 366 N.E.2d at 1277.
175. Id
176. Id. at 1276.
177. Id
17& Id. at 1277.
179. Id.
180. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1016 n.7 (1992).




of the denominator, common ownership represents an "extreme"
approach because it comes under the full force of the arbitrariness
attack. Under this approach, a takings plaintiff who holds several
parcels in a "vicinity" suffers an expanded denominator, even when
the other parcels are completely distinct from the devalued parcel but
for common ownership.1l 2 Contrary to the state court's view, whether
a claimant holds other property in the vicinity will vary from one case
to the next, for reasons often having nothing to do with the disputed
regulation and corresponding devalued property. For this reason,
other commonly owned parcels seem anything but relevant. For
example, Penn Central owned the Biltmore Hotel, but had it not, the
landmark preservation regulation would have devalued Grand
Central Terminal just the same. The New York Court of Appeals
Penn Central decision adopted an apparently arbitrary analysis, the
avoidance of which underlies, to a greater or lesser degree, each of the
conceptual severance approaches.
B. Common Ownership Plus Contiguity- The Fee Simple Approach
The most common boundary line for the relevant parcel in the
denominator analysis is the property owner's fee simple. When a
regulation devalues part of a landowner's fee simple, a court will use
the landowner's entire contiguous parcel as the denominator in the
takings equation. The factors needed to determine the relevant parcel
under this approach, thus, are limited to common ownership and
contiguity of the property. A court can fix the denominator with little
more than the deed to the property.
Professor Radin explained the natural tendency of courts to
implement the fee simple approach:
[T]he Court has traditionally understood the ordinary meaning of
property to be the owner's parcel as a whole.... This traditional
reluctance to use conceptual severance is usually chalked up to
crystallized expectations or ordinary language and culture. That is,
the appropriate understanding of what constitutes a "parcel as a
whole"-and hence the owner's "property"-is previous real-life
treatment of the resource, not the conceptual possibilities property
law holds available.183
Much earlier than Radin, Justice Brandeis pinpointed the
fundamental concept underlying contemporary "crystallized
expectations," when he perceived that "[t]he sum of the rights in the
parts can not be greater than the rights in the whole."' ' 4 The value of
182. See id. ("The Lucas dictum casts aspersions on the state court's elevation of
one factor, unity of ownership, over other factors in determining the relevant
parcel.").
183. Radin, supra note 17, at 1677.
184. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 419 (1922) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting); see supra note 140 and accompanying text.
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any segment of a fee simple only can be appreciated with respect to
the entire fee.1' 5 Simplicity, and instincts about property, buttress the
fee simple approach, and courts are prone to adopt it for these
reasons.
186
Justice Stevens leads the advocates of the contiguous fee simple
approach, not just with respect to horizontal severance but to all
theories of conceptual severance. 18  Keystoneuu and Concrete Pipet 9
weighed the harm caused by the respective regulations against the
whole of each claimant's property, and Justice Stevens, in dissent,
argued for the same analysis in First English.19'
Bevan v. Brandon Township provides one example of a court using
the fee simple as the denominator."' The plaintiffs owned six acres,
to which a twenty foot easement across a neighbor's land allowed the
only public road access. A town ordinance prevented plaintiffs from
building more than one home on their property without a public
access road at least sixty-six feet wide. Justifying Brandon Township's
ordinance was "the need for road services adequate to provide year
around access by fire, police, and like emergency vehicles."'"
Plaintiffs proposed horizontally severing the six acres into two parcels,
because their predecessor had done so for tax purposes, and they had
acquired the contiguous lots separately, but simultaneously."
The Michigan Supreme Court rejected plaintiff's argument, and
defined the commonly owned, contiguous, six-acre fee simple as the
relevant parcel."94 The court justified rejecting horizontal severance
by pointing to the negative implications of accepting it:
If [horizontal severance] were held to be so, the result would be that
it would be competent for landowners to perpetually defeat future
zoning restrictions by crisscrossing their lands on a plat map with
lines ostensibly dividing the same into parcels so small that each
would be unsuited to any foreseeable use unless combined with
185. This concept is referred to as "synergy." See infra notes 315-19 and
accompanying text.
186. See Fee, supra note 167, at 1546 n.54 (1994); Recent Cases, Regulatory
Takings, supra note 160, at 929 n.27.
187. See, eg., Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470
(1987) (rejecting vertical severance); First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of
Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 323 (1987) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(rejecting temporal severance).
188. 480 U.S. 470 (1987). Justice Stevens authored the opinion of the Court.
189. 508 U.S. 602 (1993). Justice Stevens joined in Justice Souter's opinion of the
Court. Id. at 605.
190. See 482 U.S. at 330-31 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
191. Bevan v. Brandon Township, 475 N.W.2d 37 (Mich. 1991).
192. Id. at 44 (internal quotations omitted).
193. Id. at 43.
194. Id. at 42-43 ("This Court has recognized that contiguous lots under the same
ownership are to be considered as a whole for purposes of judging the reasonableness




others. The test of reasonableness may not be distorted or thwarted
by any such artificial device.'95
The Bevan court viewed plaintiff manipulation as a sufficiently
probable consequence to reject the claimant's proposed severance as
an "artificial device."
Having determined the relevant parcel, the Bevan court addressed
what it considered the more relevant takings inquiry,196 namely,
whether the Township ordinance applied as part of a general zoning
scheme, or whether it unfairly singled out the plaintiffs."9  As
Brandon Township was not "spot zoning," but rather the ordinance
burdened all property owners equally, Bevan's takings claim failed.9 8
The Bevan court, Justice Stevens, Professor Radin, and others
recognize that the fee simple approach avoids the pitfalls of plaintiff
manipulation. Once a property owner gains permission to
horizontally sever a fee simple, every regulation that minimally
intrudes on property rights will demand compensation under Lucas.,"
Property owners always will manipulate the takings fraction to
achieve a ratio of 1/1. The "slippery slope"2°° toward the
manipulation result frustrates proposed severances such as the
plaintiff's in Bevan.01 The chief benefit of the fee simple approach is
that it prevents limitless plaintiff manipulation of the denominator-
thus preventing limitless compensation.
Arbitrariness is a likely criticism of the fee simple approach." For
example, consider two neighbors, A and B. A town ordinance
deprives all economic use of ten acres of each's property. A owns ten
acres, therefore A will prevail under Lucas, having suffered a total
taking. But suppose that B owns 100 acres. B and A have suffered
the same loss, but B will fail under Lucas and almost certainly under
Penn Central. The fee simple arbitrarily selects A for compensation
and excludes B. B loses simply because of coincidentally possessing a
greater parcel.2 °3  The Bevan court did not directly address the
195. Id. at 43 (emphasis in original) (quoting Korby v. Redford Township, 82
N.W.2d 441,443 (Mich. 1957)).
196. Justice Stevens, too, finds the general application of the law the most relevant
issue in regulatory takings cases. See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003,
1072-75 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
197. Bevan, 475 N.W.2d at 43-44.
198. Id. at 43 n.11.
199. See Radin, supra note 17, at 1678.
200. See id.
201. Professor Epstein, however, condones the "slippery slope." See infra text
accompanying notes 270-76.
202. See Fee, supra note 167, at 1552.
203. See id. Fee notes that not only does the fee simple approach discriminate
arbitrarily, but it does so against owners of larger tracts. The fee simple approach
thus acts as a "deep-pocket rule." Id. But Fee adds that the approach can also
discriminate against poor (presumably "shallow-pocket") landowners, such as farmers
and ranchers owning large parcels. See id. at 1553.
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arbitrariness criticism, and one commentator suggests that courts
applying the fee simple approach do so mechanistically, without
evaluating its drawbacks and alternatives.' °
C. Historically Cognizable Property Interests-Justice Scalia's
Approach
Between never horizontally severing the fee simple, and endlessly
severing the fee simple, rests the suggestion that a property owner can
define the relevant parcel according to historically cognizable
property rights. Justice Scalia originally appended this approach in
footnote seven of Lucas:
The answer to [the denominator problem] may lie in how the
owner's reasonable expectations have been shaped by the State's
law of property-i.e., whether and to what degree the State's law has
accorded legal recognition and protection to the particular interest
in land with respect to which the takings claimant alleges a
diminution in (or elimination of) value. 205
Under this approach, a demarcated property right can enclose the
relevant parcel if state law had commonly recognized that
demarcation before the offending regulation came into effect. Justice
Scalia did not elaborate in footnote seven, but presumably, if a court
could determine that state law has legally distinguished one stick in
the bundle of property rights, then that stick defines the relevant
parcel.
Pennsylvania Coal exemplifies the footnote seven approach.
Pennsylvania law had recognized support rights before the Legislature
impacted those rights with the Kohler Act. 6 Although only a vertical
slice of the coal company's fee simple, support rights were known at
the time as the "third estate."' It was the "third estate" for which the
Pennsylvania Coal Company bargained when it deeded surface rights
to homeowners 2ts Implicit in the Kohler Act, of course, was historical
recognition of the "third estate," as it transferred support rights from
underground owners to above-ground owners.21 Boundaried by
bright lines, support rights easily stood apart for Justice Holmes to
analyze them distinctly.
204. See id. at 1546, 1550 ("[A] number of courts seem to have implicitly employed
this uniformity-of-ownership definition without even evaluating the propriety of other
rules.").
205. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1016 n.7 (1992).
206. See supra notes 134-37 and accompanying text.
207. See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
208. See Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393,412 (1922).
209. One state regulation, however, does not shape reasonable expectations.
Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 121 S. Ct. 2448 (2001). Justice Scalia's approach,
presumably, would require considerably more than one mere regulation to sever a fee
simple for the takings fraction.
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The courts have not seized on Justice Scalia's historically cognizable
rights approach, perhaps because it is not clear what rights count as
historically recognized.210 Water rights might provide one example.1
Definitional objections over what rights are historically recognized
presumably could be resolved without modifying the basic approach.
The multifactor approach discussed below, for example, commonly
incorporates reasonable expectations into the denominator analysis,
evaluating recognizability on a case-by-case basis.12 Under the
multifactor approach, then, a compelling, recognizable property
interest could influence a court to horizontally sever a fee simple.
Justice Scalia's approach responds both to the chief objection to the
prevalent fee simple approach- arbitrariness -and to the chief
objection to the libertarian approach-denominator manipulation by
the claimant. First, when a regulation strips a historically recognized
property right, a property owner will not be denied compensation
merely because the fee simple extends greater than that right.
Second, a property owner will not succeed in refining the denominator
at will, but history and traditional acceptance will guide the
denominator analysis.
D. Subjective Multifactor Analysis- The Federal Circuit Approach
Rigidly applying the common ownership and contiguity criteria
arbitrarily harms landowners possessing larger tracts, because large
parcels are less likely to suffer total economic loss. 213 Yet straying too
far from the common ownership or fee simple approaches contravenes
Holmes's maxim: "Government hardly could go on if to some extent
values incident to property could not be diminished without paying
for every such change in the general law. '214 Courts uncomfortable
with either result, the Federal Circuit in particular, have found a
middle ground, setting out multifactor analyses to determine "the
parcel as realistically and fairly as possible, given the entire factual
and regulatory environment. ''215
210. Considter, for example, that in Lucas, Justice Scalia pondered that common
law principles "rarely support prohibition of the essential use of land." Lucas, 505
U.S. at 1031 (internal quotations omitted). Matching Justice Scalia's stray dicta
produces the result that whenever a government regulation prevents an "essential"
use of land it will be a total taking requiring compensation. The Lucas exception will
not apply, unless common law deemed the use in question an "essential nuisance." In
any event, given the amorphous and potentially broad concept of "essential use," it is
easy to imagine a large subset of severing concepts under Justice Scalia's approach.
211. See generally Stupak-Thrall v. United States, 89 F.3d 1269 (6th Cir. 1996).
212. See infra notes 231-40 and accompanying text.
213. See supra note 203.
214. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922); supra text
accompanying note 165.
215. Ciampitti v. United States, 22 Cl. Ct. 310, 319 (1991).
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Beginning with Florida Rock Industries, Inc. v. United States"b and
Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States,2 17 the Federal Circuit has
repeatedly invoked subjective factors with which to sever a claimant's
fee simple. In both cases, the Federal Circuit evaluated a smaller
parcel than the property owner's entire fee simple. Subsequent cases
have used Florida Rock and Loveladies Harbor to launch a number of
multifactor analyses, each of which accepts that the mindset of the
property owner may suffice to sever a parcel into smaller segments.
In 1972, Florida Rock Industries purchased 1,560 acres in the
Everglades for the purpose of mining limestone.21 In 1980, Florida
Rock applied to the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers ("Corps") under §
404 of the Clean Water Act to mine ninety-eight of its acres. The
Corps denied the permit, and Florida Rock brought a regulatory
takings claim for the ninety-eight acres. The Federal Circuit upheld
the trial court's determination that the ninety-eight acres, not the 1560
acre fee simple, defined the relevant parcel.2 9 The pivotal fact for the
Florida Rock court was that the Corps would have denied a permit for
the whole 1560 acres.'2 The court likened the possibility that the
Corps would grant a permit on any of the remaining acres to the
possibility that "one might put a pot of water on a hot stove and have
it freeze." 1
In Loveladies Harbor, the claimant, Loveladies, began with 250
acres in Ocean County, New Jersey. It developed 199 of those acres
before Congress passed the Clean Water Act in 1972.2 Wetlands
made up the remaining 51 acres, with one of those acres having
already been filled. Loveladies needed permits from the New Jersey
Department of Environmental Protection ("NJDEP") and the Corps
before it could fill its land. When Loveladies applied for the first
permit, the NJDEP permitted filling and developing 11.5 acres and
the one previously filled acre on the condition that Loveladies leave
its remaining 38.5 acres intact as a conservation easementpr The
Corps then denied Loveladies's application for a second permit for
the 12.5 acres. 4
The Federal Circuit defined the relevant parcel as the 12.5 impacted
acres. It excluded the remaining 38.5 acres essentially on fairness
grounds, holding that "[ilt would seem ungrateful in the extreme" to
force Loveladies to forfeit some of its property yet continue to
216. 791 F.2d 893 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
217. 28 F.3d 1171 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
218. Florida Rock, 791 F.2d at 895.
219. See id. at 904.
220. See id.
221. Id.
222. Loveladies Harbor, 28 F.3d at 1174.
223. See id. at 1174 n.6.
224. Id. at 1174.
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attribute to it the value of that property.-' Additionally, when the
government argued that the original 250 acres ought to comprise the
relevant parcel, the court sliced through the original fee simple. The
court found that "the timing of transfers in light of the developing
regulatory environment" was a relevant consideration for the takings
fraction.2 6 This factor worked in Loveladies's favor, as they sold 199
acres prior to the Clean Water Act's implementation, thus those acres
could not count in the denominator 27
Both cases departed from the traditional fee simple approach. The
Federal Circuit added to the analysis its understanding that the
denominator problem needs "a flexible approach, designed to account
for factual nuances."'-s This nuanced approach diverges from the fee
simple and libertarian approaches, each of which apply rigidly.
Drawing on the "nuance" principle to define the denominator, the
Federal Circuit has led several courts to implement multifactor
analyses. The most common approach, first articulated by Ciampitti v.
United States, specifies four factors for consideration: (1) "the degree
of contiguity"; (2) "the dates of acquisition"; (3) "the extent to which
the parcel has been treated as a single unit"; and (4) "the extent to
which the protected lands enhance the value of remaining lands." '229
Under this approach, a court will horizontally sever a fee simple when
a balance of the factors tips in the claimant's favor. Several courts
have adopted Ciampitti's multifactor analysis.?30
For example, the Supreme Court of Michigan considered the
Ciampitti factors in K & K Construction v. Department of Natural
Resources.3 1 The Department of Natural Resources denied plaintiffs'
proposal to build a restaurant, sports complex, and multiple-family
homes on its eighty-two acres, because wetlands soaked twenty-eight
acres of the property."2 Plaintiffs argued that its fee simple must be
split into four parcels, as zoning laws and previous development
already provided bright lines with which to sever.33  The court's
analysis began with Bevan's fee simple, "nonsegmentation"
principle.'T But the court declared that "[d]etermining the size of the




229. Ciampitti v. United States, 22 Cl. Ct. 310, 318 (1991); see Mark A. Chertok,
The Federal Regulation of Wetlands, in Environmental Litigation 715, 783 (A.L.I.-
A.B.A. Course of Study, June 2000), WL SE98 ALI-ABA 715.
230. See, e.g., District Intown Properties v. District of Columbia, 198 F.3d 874, 880
(D.C. Cir. 1999); K & K Constr. Inc. v. Dep't of Natural Res., 575 N.W.2d 531, 536-37
(Mich. 1998).
231. 575 N.W.2d 531,536-37.
232. Id. at 534.
233. See id. at 536-38.
234. Id. at 536; see supra notes 191-198 and accompanying text.
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denominator parcel is inherently a factual inquiry,"!" then marched
through Ciampitti's multifactor analysis. 6  First, three of the four
segments within the claimant's fee simple were contiguous.' Second,
the same three segments were commonly owned prior to
commencement of litigation.23s And third, the three segments were
subject to a comprehensive development plan. "9 The court ruled that
the denominator must contain at least the three segments, and
remanded the case for further factual inquiry into the fourth
segment.240
Palm Beach Isles Associates v. United States used a slightly altered
multifactor approach.24 1 The plaintiffs, Palm Beach Isles Associates
("PBIA"), purchased 312 acres, then sold 261 of those acres to a
developer for one million dollars.242  All that remained was Lake
Worth.243  Florida's Department of Environmental Regulation
("DER") denied a permit to fill and develop the 51 acres, under the
Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899 and the Clean Water Act of 1972.2
The Federal Circuit's point of departure was Loveladies Harbor's
mandate to consider factual "nuances" in the denominator analysis?'4
It then found that "[t]he timing of property acquisition and
development, compared with the enactment and implementation of
the governmental regimen that led to the regulatory imposition, is a
factor, but only one factor, to be considered in determining the proper
denominator for analysis."'  The Federal Circuit then reversed the
trial court, and horizontally severed PBIA's property.
The crucial fact for the court was that PBIA owned different
development schemes for the upland portion and the lake portion of
the property (Ciampitti's third factor).247 Also relevant was that the
court found the DER's denial rested heavily on the Clean Water Act,
and PBIA purchased the property prior to that law's enactment.2 48
The Federal Circuit essentially reversed the trial court's factual
finding that the Rivers and Harbors Act supported the DER's denial,
235. K & K Constr., 575 N.W.2d at 536.
236. Id. at 536-38.
237. Id. at 537.
238. Id-
239. The court did not apply Ciampitis fourth factor. See id.
240. Id. at 538-39.
241. Palm Beach Isles Assocs. v. United States, 208 F.3d 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2000); see
Recent Cases, Regulatory Takings, supra note 160.
242. Palm Beach, 208 F.3d at 1377.
243. Id
244. Id. at 1378.






which, if true, would suggest that PBIA was on notice about
restrictions on its property.249
Other multifactor analyses have gained approval. A New Jersey
appeals court recently employed a ten-factor analysis to determine the
relevant parcel.2 0 The court noted that the factors grouped into two
categories: the history of the ownership and the development of the
property211 One commentator has proposed a six-factor approach,
which in several respects resembles the Penn Central balancing test
for whether a taking has occurred1 2
The thread weaving together the multifactor approaches is the
willingness to consider subjective criteria when horizontally severing a
fee simple.z5 Whether a property owner thinks of a fee simple in
segments becomes relevant under every multifactor approach.
Subjective factors partially meet the arbitrariness and manipulation
objections, but not satisfactorily. Regarding arbitrariness, a takings
claim will not fail under the multifactor approach simply because a
claimant happens to own a parcel greater than that which was
harmed.' However, because common ownership and contiguity
constitute two important factors, the possibility that a takings claim
will fail on account of a claimant's additional holdings remains under
the multifactor approach.15
Plaintiff manipulation of the kind that Bevan sought to avoid, z6
similarly appears a likely outcome of the multifactor approach.
Returning to Palm Beach, a simple restatement of PBIA's maneuver
looks as follows: (1) purchase 312 acres for $380,000; (2) sell all but
the lake portion of the property for $1,000,000, in light of a 69-year-
old regulatory scheme on the lake and four years prior to a second
regulatory scheme; (3) attempt to dredge and fill the lake; (4) find that
the established regulatory schemes prevent filling the lake; (5)
demand $10,000,000 compensation for a "taking" of the lake
portion. 7 With contiguity and common ownership stacked against it,
PBIA prevailed upon the Federal Circuit to sever its original 312 acres
simply by asserting that it thought of parts of its property differently.
Although PBIA's tactic succeeded in the Federal Circuit, it illustrates
249. See Palm Beach Isles Assocs. v. United States, 231 F.3d 1365, 1370-72 (Fed.
Cir. 2000) (denial of petition for rehearing en banc) (Gajarsa, J., dissenting).
250. See E. Cape May Assocs. v. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 777 A.2d 1015, 1025 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001).
251. See id. at 1025-26.
252. See Lisker, supra note 18, at 720-25.
253. Accord Fee, supra note 167; Huffman, supra note 29; Recent Cases,
Regulatory Takings, supra note 160.
254. See, e.g., Florida Rock Indus., Inc. v. United States, 791 F.2d 893 (Fed. Cir.
1986).
255. See Fee, supra note 167.
256. See supra text accompanying note 195.
257. Palm Beach Isles Assocs. v. United States, 208 F.3d 1374, 1377-78 (Fed. Cir.
2000).
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precisely the type of "distorted,... artificial device" that the Bevan
court, among others, steadfastly rejected.' s
E. Economic Substantiality- Fee's Approach
John Fee proposes the following approach: "any identifiable
segment of land is a parcel for purposes of regulatory taking analysis if
prior to regulation it could have been put to at least one economically
viable use, independent of the surrounding land segments."' z 9 Fee
would permit the plaintiff to define the relevant, economically
"substantial" parcel.' If the parcel contains at least one economic
use, independent of the remainder of the fee simple, then a court must
use the parcel for the denominator. For example, when a set-back
ordinance prevents a building owner from constructing a magazine
stand on his front lawn, then the front lawn will suffice as the
denominator.
Fee asserts that two limiting principles prevent his approach from
allowing complete plaintiff manipulation. First, the rule applies only
to horizontal severance. 6' Second, a segment of a fee simple will not
suffice as the relevant parcel unless a claimant demonstrates "that
there existed prior to regulation at least one economically viable use
for the land, the value of which is derived independently of the
immediately surrounding land interests."2 2  Fee's second limiting
principle is essentially the substantiality rule restated. A claimant able
to prove a parcel's substantiality will succeed in horizontally severing
his property under Fee's approach.
Having horizontally severed an economically independent parcel, a
property owner is only halfway to prevailing on a total taking. The
property owner must prove that the regulation has taken not only the
parcel's independent economic use, but all of the parcel's economic
uses, including those dependent on the "surrounding land interests."'' 3
When the parcel retains any post-regulatory use then it has not lost all
economically beneficial or productive use under Lucas.'2 Returning
to the vacant front lawn, Fee suggests: "a building owner could not
claim damages from a set-back ordinance for loss of magazine stand
258. Supra text accompanying note 195.
259. Fee, supra note 167, at 1557. Substantiality's origin can be traced perhaps to
Justice Rehnquist's dissent in Keystone. Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v.
DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 514-15 (1987) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("The need to
consider the effect of regulation on some identifiable segment of property makes all
important the admittedly difficult task of defining the relevant parcel.").
260. See Fee, supra note 167, at 1557.
261. See id.
262 Id. at 1558.




profits if in fact the operation of a magazine stand would lower the
value of the entire lot. 265
The basis of the substantiality approach is that when a claimant
suffers a total taking of less than the entire fee simple, the Lucas rule
should still be eligible. Substantiality insures that government will not
deny compensation merely because a harmed landowner
coincidentally owns more contiguous property than that segment
which is harmed. This coincidence was not present in Lucas, but
substantiality suggests that had it been present it would not have
mattered. Substantiality also answers the critics of subjective factor
analysis, by withdrawing the property owner's intentions from
consideration.2" Subjective criteria are not relevant to substantiality,
because any rational property holder will put land to its most valuable
economic use.267  A court can safely assume that only "rare"
circumstances will find a plaintiff claiming the total loss of an
economically beneficial stick that he never intended to use.2
One court, the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania, has adopted
the substantiality approach.269
F. The Libertarian Approach
If common ownership represents one terminus of the denominator
problem continuum, then Professor Richard Epstein's libertarian
approach represents the other. Professor Epstein would find a taking
any moment that the government inhibits any property right. "Any
deprivation of rights is a taking, regardless of how it is effected or the
damages it causes."270
The critical inquiry under this approach is of the thing taken.,
Whether a wetlands regulation deprives an owner of one or twenty
acres, each instance deserves reimbursement. Professor Epstein
believes that the denominator, therefore, is irrelevant.
265. Id.
266. See id. at 1560.
267. Id. at 1560-61.
268. Id.
269. Machipongo Land & Coal Co. v. Dept. of Envtl. Res., 719 A.2d 19, 26-27 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1998). The Pennsylvania court stated:
However, while the regulated land would first be considered under this
approach, to determine whether it actually would be the denominator would
depend on the answers the courts received to the following questions:
whether the regulated land had value prior to the regulation; whether the
regulated land has a separate use from the non-regulated contiguous
parcel(s) -i.e., whether it may be profitably used if it is the only parcel; and
if the regulated land has value separate from the contiguous land, whether
all of its economic benefit is gone.
Id.; see Brief for Petitioner at 46, Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 121 S. Ct. 2448 (2001)
(No. 99-2047).
270. Epstein, Takings, supra note 66, at 62.
271. See id.; Epstein, Erratic Takings Jurisprudence, supra note 139, at 899.
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[A]ny conceptualization of numerators and denominators bears
absolutely no relationship to what is gained or lost by property
owners as a result of the statute.... The amount of compensation
should always depend on what is taken from the owner. The more
that is taken, the more that should be paid. The bill the courts hand
to the state should depend only on the loss sustained, not on the
ratio of the size of what is taken to the size of what is retained.-m
Takings analysis needs not a fraction, only a number indicating the
harm. Professor Epstein's response to the denominator problem is to
deny that it exists, on the ground that any remaining value that might
inflate the denominator is not relevant.
In reality, whether the libertarian approach admits a ratio or not,
the result is the same. The relevant parcel in the takings fraction is
defined by a regulation's harm. Because the numerator derives from
the same criterion, under Professor Epstein's view, the takings
fraction will always equal 1/1. In short, Lucas plus Professor Epstein
equals repayment in every instance of government action. -7
The advantage of the libertarian approach is that it answers the
arbitrariness criticism of the common ownership approach? 4 The
disadvantage is that it substitutes for arbitrariness the same harm that
the common ownership approach prevents: excessive plaintiff
manipulation. Excessive plaintiff manipulation would thwart Justice
Holmes's maxim, requiring government to pay "for every.., change
in the general law" that "incident[ally]" affects private property.? 5
Unlike the common ownership approach, no court ever has adopted
the libertarian approach to defining the relevant parcel. Professor
Epstein has, however, influenced the denominator problem
considerably, as his view consistently underlies the opinions of
Justices Scalia and Rehnquist. 276
None of the six approaches described above has resolved the
denominator problem. The next part closely scrutinizes the
approaches, addressing the internal flaws and troubling consequences
of each. It concludes with the fee simple approach, which alone
satisfactorily preserves fair takings inquiries.
III. RETHINKING THE DENOMINATOR PROBLEM
Part II laid out six approaches to the denominator problem on a
theoretical continuum. At the far left of the continuum, common
272. Epstein, Erratic Takings Jurispndence, supra note 139, at 899.
273. Professor Epstein concedes, however, a limit to his categorical approach,
admitting that compensation is not due when government acts to prevent a common
law nuisance. See Epstein, Takings, supra note 66, at 111.
274. See supra text accompanying notes 202-04.
275. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393,413 (1922).
276. Libertarian themes underlie Lucas, First English, and Justice Rehnquist's
dissents in Penn Central and Keystone.
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ownership 77  presents the preferable approach from the
government's-the public's-perspective. This approach inflates the
denominator, making the private individual's burden appear light at
times when it is heavy. The common ownership approach suggests
little chance of success for takings claimants, thereby stripping much
of the meaning from the Takings Clause. At the far right of the
continuum, the libertarian view278 wholly embodies the private
individual's perspective. This approach neglects the government's
competing interest, making every uncompensated interference with
property rights appear unconstitutional. The libertarian view renders
the police power to promote public health, safety, and welfare
meaningless. Neither the common ownership approach nor the
libertarian view recognizes the valid arguments at the opposite pole.
The remaining four approaches propose a middle ground. Each
approach offers a method for limiting government's ability to include
additional segments of property in the takings equation. Such a
limiting principle is needed to avoid the left extreme, which suffers for
including additional segments arbitrarily, when a claimant happens to
own them. Each of the remaining four approaches also proposes a
method for limiting a private individual's ability to manipulate the
denominator, such that compensation will be required for every slight
infringement. Without such a limiting principle, these approaches
would not achieve a middle ground, but would slide the "slippery
slope" to Professor Epstein's libertarian view.279
Merely navigating between the extreme approaches, however, will
not suffice to resolve the denominator problem. In regulatory takings
disputes, a claimant seeks to emphasize the harm caused by a
regulation. But regulations do not merely harm individuals, they also
benefit the public. If a court ignores this benefit, then every burden
on private individuals will appear unreasonable, or, literally, without a
reason.
Because legitimate reasons support all land use regulations, this
part challenges the approaches to account for those reasons. The
form of this challenge is the benefits fraction, which measures a
regulation's benefits in much the same way that the takings fraction
measures harm. The result of this challenge is two-fold. First,
horizontal severance approaches are seen to embody an impermissibly
narrow focus. By advocating that fee simple boundary lines are
irrelevant, each version of horizontal severance fails to bound the
measurement of benefits by a government regulation. Second, by
responding to the benefits fraction, the fee simple approach
277. See supra Part II.A.
278. See supra Part II.F.
279. See Radin, supra note 17, at 1677-78 ("[A]s soon as one adopts conceptual
severance... there is an easy slippery slope to the radical Epstein position.").
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satisfactorily, rather than arbitrarily as critics fear, distinguishes
between takings claimants.
A. The Extreme Approaches- The Libertarian View and Common
Ownership
Professor Epstein refers to the "whole exercise" to which this Note
is directed as a "massive diversion."' If Professor Epstein is right,
then the inquiry into the takings fraction must end with the libertarian
view, and every government action that offends a property holder's
right to possess, use, or dispose of property (except common law
nuisance regulations) requires monetary compensation?" But it is
useful at least to assume that Professor Epstein's dismissal of the
denominator problem is in error, for three reasons.
First, the libertarian approach uses a broad reading of the Takings
Clause, justified by a historical understanding that the framers of the
Fifth Amendment generally opposed measures designed to
redistribute wealth.' This historical understanding is not universally
accepted, and more thorough accounts of the Founding reveal
precisely the contrary, that the framers intended a narrow scope for
the Takings Clause.' Further, the Supreme Court exhibited
deference to government's police power in nineteenth-century takings
cases, demonstrating an approach to the Takings Clause inconsistent
with the libertarian view.28
Second, although the libertarian approach is clear and consistent, its
implementation would overturn decades of Supreme Court precedent,
including several key decisions-Penn Central, Keystone, and
Concrete Pipe, both generally on the Takings Clause and specifically
on the denominator problem.' - Professor Epstein explicitly held out
Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining,' in which the Supreme Court
upheld a strip mining regulation against a takings challenge, as
wrongly decided.28 Yet not only does Hodel remain good law, Justice
Scalia cited Hodel to support the Lucas categorical total takings rule
280. Epstein, Erratic Takings Jurisprudence, supra note 139, at 899; see supra Part
II.F.
281. Cf supra note 66.
282. See Epstein, Takings, supra note 66, at 29 ("It is very clear that the founders
shared Locke's and Blackstone's affection for private property, which is why they
inserted the eminent domain provision in the Bill of Rights."); Treanor, Takings
Clause, supra note 54, at 815-16 ("The Takings Clause, according to Epstein, mirrors
Locke's philosophy about property, whose central premise is antiredistributivism.").
283. See Treanor, Takings Clause, supra note 54; Martin S. Flaherty, History "Lite"
in Modem American Constitutionalisn, 95 Colum. L. Rev. 523,556-67 (1995).
284. See, eg., Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887); see also Treanor, Takings
Clause, supra note 54, at 797 n.81 (reviewing nineteenth-century and early twentieth-
century cases); id at 816 ("[T]he clause was initially read to have a limited scope.").
285. See supra Part II.B.1.
286. 452 U.S. 264 (1981).
287. See Epstein, Takings, supra note 66, at 124-25.
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claimed as a victory for property rights advocates.2" But then,
Professor Epstein found Lucas, though rightly decided, wrongly
principled too.2 9
Third, plaintiff manipulation of the denominator is not necessary
under the libertarian view, because a claimant will win compensation
in every case.290 However, the results of excessive manipulation,
where the claimant chooses the denominator,2 91 and the libertarian
view, where the denominator is irrelevant, are the same. Common
law nuisances will circumscribe the police power, such that citizens
will be forced to pay offending property owners to obey government
regulations enacted for public health, safety, and welfare.2"
Consequently, private property holders will consistently trump sincere
efforts to enact regulations that benefit those unable to pay
compensation.293 Recalling P,294 for example, future generations of
Rhode Island citizens, and, of course, plant and animal inhabitants of
the wetlands ecosystem cannot compensate P for the benefit they
receive from the CRMC's protection. Under the libertarian approach,
either current Rhode Island residents must rally to cover those
interests, or P will pave over eighteen acres of coastline. As the other
approaches aim to avoid this trap, indulging those approaches, and the
"massive diversion," is worthwhile.
Like the libertarian approach, the common ownership approach-
that all of a claimant's property in the vicinity of the affected parcel is
relevant 95-is too extreme to provide an adequate denominator. In
P's case, the success of the takings claim will turn on whether P
288. See supra note 77.
289. See Epstein, Symposium, supra note 73.
290. See supra Part II.F.
291. See supra notes 165-68 and accompanying text.
292. Regardless of the ability of taxpayers to compensate individuals, and the
complications with such a shift in policy, the prospect of paying property holders to
obey government regulations is less reasonable than it is absurd. See, e.g., John A.
Humbach, Should Taxpayers Pay People To Obey Environmental Laws?, 6 Fordham
Envtl. L.J. 423,425-26 (1995).
Should taxpayers have to pay people not to put pollutants into streams and
reservoirs? Should taxpayers have to pay people not to kill off entire
species? Should taxpayers have to reach into their pockets and pay people
not to disperse development seamlessly across the countryside, relentlessly
consuming, fragmenting, and degrading our nation's remaining natural lands
until almost all is gone? Should we, in short, have to pay people not to
engage in land-uses that have been determined to be too socially
unacceptable to allow?
Id.
293. Future generations of neighboring property owners, poor citizens, endangered
species, and threatened ecosystems can be most harmed by an unregulated parcel, yet
none of these groups own a benefactor able to compensate offending property
owners.
294. See supra notes 87-88 and accompanying text. "P's" example is based on
Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 121 S. Ct. 2448 (2001).
295. See supra Part II.A.
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happens to own other parcels in the vicinity of Winnipaug Pond. The
full force of the arbitrariness criticism comes to bear at this point. P's
non-contiguous holdings may not relate in any way to the affected
parcel apart from ownership by the same person, yet the common
ownership, vicinity standard is met, and the denominator expands
accordingly. No successful approach to the denominator should turn
on such happenstance.
Applied generally, the common ownership approach seems an
"extreme" and "unsupportable" alternative to the denominator
problem, as Justice Scalia observed. 26 But the approach operated
sensibly in Penn Central.2' There, the economic potential of each of
Penn Central's additional holdings directly depended on Grand
Central Station, as smaller stores depend on a flagship store in a
shopping center.29 The economic interdependence of Penn Central's
holdings partially solved the arbitrariness problem, as the court found
nothing unfair about including the benefit conferred on Penn Central
by the landmark designation along with the harm.? When commonly
owned holdings in the vicinity and the affected parcel are
economically interdependent, as in Penn Central, including those
holdings presents an approach no more "extreme" than the fee simple
approach.3 °
B. Numerator Theory- Three Versions of Horizontal Severance
Justice Scalia, the Federal Circuit, and John Fee offer three round
versions of horizontal severance, each of which fail to squeeze into the
denominator problem's square hole. Horizontal severance focuses on
harm to a private individual. When the right factors are present, °t
each approach would ignore a property owner's fee simple, and
narrowly circumscribe the takings denominator to reflect more closely
the harm caused by a regulation. Each version of horizontal
severance advocates conceptualizing property in pieces smaller than
the fee simple, because often it is small pieces of land that a regulation
harms. Under this conceptualization, when one small piece is harmed,
no other pieces are relevant, because that small piece is capable of
being evaluated on its own.' In other words, that small piece alone
296. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1016 n.7 (1992); see text
accompanying notes 180-82.
297. Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 366 N.E.2d 1271 (N.Y. 1977).
298. See id. at 1276.
299. See id. at 1277.
300. See infra Part III.C.
301. The "right factors" vary between each approach. See supra Parts II.C., II.D.,
II.E.
302. The small piece can be evaluated on its own, provided, of course, that it meets
the minimal criteria for severance set out in each of the three approaches. See supra
Parts II.C., II.D., II.E.
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can be a "complete thing taken.""3 3  To accept any version of
horizontal severance, one must envision property as a collection of
tiny "complete things," each of which functions independent enough
of the other that an entire constitutional takings inquiry should be
conducted into that piece alone.
But horizontal severance's conceptualization of property does not
account for the interdependence between pieces of land. The use of
one piece of property impacts other, adjacent pieces. It is land's
interdependence that prompts legislation to begin with. When the use
of wetlands will impact other land interests, for example, government
represents those interests, regulating when necessary for their
betterment. To insure public health, safety, and welfare, government
must conceptualize land more broadly than does each private
individual. The harm from filling wetlands spreads much farther than
one horizontally severed parcel, and farther than even the fee simple.
But, representing the public interest, government does not force its
broad conceptualization upon private individuals, compelling each to
abandon his wetlands to coordinate their use with all the adjacent,
interdependent parcels. Government does, however, provide
parameters for land use, when private individuals' inability to account
for neighboring interests threatens public health, safety, and welfare.
Horizontal severance narrowly focuses on the individual's
conception of a regulation's impact, to the exclusion of the
government's conception. But takings disputes are about reconciling
one conception with the other. The landowner asserts harm to his
independent parcel of property; government asserts benefit to the
community's interdependent parcels. A court's task is to weigh the
harm and the benefit. If it adopts one conception to the exclusion of
the other, as horizontal severance suggests, then the court will not be
able to carry out its task. Under horizontal severance, a regulation
appears only to cause harm. By misrepresenting every regulation's
actual impact, horizontal severance's narrow focus is inadequate.
In response to this inadequacy, I propose a benefits fraction. The
benefits fraction reflects government's conception of land as
interdependent parcels. The purpose of creating the benefits fraction
is: (1) to represent accurately the beneficial impact of a regulation on
one segment of property to neighboring segments; (2) to provide a
method for comparing a regulation's harmful impact with its
beneficial impact; (3) to demonstrate that when the fee simple
boundary line does not circumscribe the regulation's impact, the
benefit will unfailingly outweigh the harm caused by a regulation; and
(4) to reemphasize the need for balance in takings inquiries.
303. Radin, supra note 17, at 1677 (commenting on Nollan v. California Coastal
Commission); supra text accompanying note 156.
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The remainder of this section describes how the benefits fraction
fulfills these four purposes. Subsection 1 sets out the benefits fraction.
It explains the relationship between the numerator in the benefits
fraction and the denominator in the takings fraction, using a recent
case in the District of Columbia, District Intown Properties v. District
of Columbia,3° as a means for comparison. Subsections 2, 3, and 4
criticize each version of horizontal severance for suggesting too
narrow an approach to the denominator problem. "Numerator
theory" captures the unusual consequence of horizontal severance.
When fee simple boundary lines are not relevant to the takings
denominator, they remain irrelevant to the benefits numerator. The
result is that a regulation's benefit will greatly exceed the harm in
every instance, such that, under horizontal severance, no private
individual ever will prevail on a takings claim. Numerator theory is
the proposition that when a claimant is permitted to deviate from the
fee simple boundary line in the takings denominator, government is
thereby permitted to deviate from the fee simple boundary line in the
benefits numerator.
This Note's final section reviews the fee simple approach, which
alone adequately responds to the benefits fraction. As the fee simple
approach negotiates between the individual's and the public's
conceptions of property, it presents the only approach able to balance
the interests on both sides of takings claims.
1. The Benefits Fraction
The benefits fraction measures, generally speaking, a particular
parcel's impact on the property surrounding it. When a piece of
property could be used in one way to benefit the surrounding land
interests, or in another way to harm the surrounding land interests,
the benefits fraction will reflect the difference. For example, the
benefits fraction would measure the difference between draining and
filling a lake versus leaving the lake in place, according to each use's
impact on all of the lakefront property, and any other property
affected by the use of the lake. As shown below, draining and filling
the lake likely would result in a smaller benefits fraction than would
leaving the lake in place. Imposing a no dumping regulation on the
lake likely would drive the fraction even higher, closer to one. The
benefits fraction works as a mirror image of the takings fraction,
which measures, of course, harm.
304. 198 F.3d 874 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
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Denominator analysis begins with the assumption that the best way
to represent harm associated with government action is with a
fraction:
economic harm to a particular parcel caused by a government
regulation
unregulated economic value of the relevant parcel
The same fraction, slightly restated, reads
actual harm done by the regulation to a particular parcel
potential harm a regulation could have done to the relevant parcel
"Relevance" sets in motion the takings inquiry using this fraction.
First, a claimant must define the relevant parcel. Second, the claimant
must calculate the unregulated value of that particular parcel, i.e., the
potential harm that particular parcel can suffer. Third, the claimant
must identify the actual harm suffered by the defined, particular
parcel. If the claimant defines the relevant parcel narrowly, then the
denominator will contract and the fraction will come closer to 1/1.
But most of the time government actions create benefits, as well as
harm.305 A regulation's benefit, unlike its harm, cannot be measured
305. "Harm," of course, really means "economic harm." This definition is as
idiomatic as it is inevitable. See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1065 n.3
(Stevens, J., dissenting). Harm caused by a regulation need not be economic to imply
constitutional concerns. Nevertheless, takings claimants will always ask the court to
address the economic impact of a regulation. Thus, to a plaintiff, harm equals
economic harm.
"Benefit" need not be so constrained. If only the economic benefit of a
regulation were relevant, then the following phenomenon would result. When the
economic harm to the individual exceeds the economic benefit to the relevant
surrounding land interests, the individual will always win. When the economic benefit
to the surrounding land interests exceeds the economic harm to the individual, no
takings dispute will arise, because the relevant surrounding land interests will pay the
individual to use the parcel as if it is regulated. Further, mere transaction costs,
which, theoretically, taxation and just compensation could remedy, are not the only
obstruction to the natural transaction between the harmed and the benefited. The
real obstruction is that substantial non-economic benefits, such as preventing harmful
externalities to future generations of neighboring property holders, or vulnerable
ecosystems, have no economic benefactors in the market. See supra note 293 and
accompanying text.
Nor need "benefit" connote the conventional sense of "benefit," as in value
gained. As Justice Scalia instructs, "gaining a benefit" only differs semantically from
"avoiding a harm." Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1024. "Benefit," in the benefit fraction, can
mean the avoidance of harm, as in "the relevant surrounding land interests benefit
from the absence of a nearby nuclear facility."
"Benefit" thus should mean, simply, all that is improved by a government
action. It is partly for this reason that the benefits fraction, unconstrained by the
commonly owned fee simple, overwhelms the harm fraction likewise unconstrained.
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by observing the relevant parcel in the denominator analysis. Instead,
the benefit to the property surrounding the relevant parcel must be
taken into account. Once the takings fraction is resolved so that the
relevant parcel is determined, it becomes possible to ascertain the
benefit that the relevant parcel, as regulated, provides nearby
property. And, as with harm, the best representation of a regulation's
benefit is a fraction:
actual benefit created by the regulation on the particular parcel
realized by the relevant surrounding land interests
potential benefit created by a regulation on the particular parcel
that could be realized by particular surrounding land interests
The denominator of the benefits fraction is the maximum benefit
that a regulation on a parcel can provide to surrounding land interests.
If the relevant parcel is a lake, opening the lake to the public and
providing free boat, swimming, and fishing access conceivably
represents the lake's maximal benefit to surrounding land interests.31
The numerator in the benefits fraction is the actual benefit that a
parcel, as regulated, provides surrounding land interests. Resolution
of the numerator depends on which actual benefits properly count in
the equation.
As with the harm fraction, "relevance" sets in motion the takings
inquiry using the benefits fraction. First, the government must define
the relevant surrounding land interests. Second, the government must
identify the actual benefit that the particular surrounding land
interests realize from the regulation on the particular parcel (as
defined by the claimant in the harm fraction). Third, the government
must calculate the potential benefit that the defined, particular
surrounding land interests can realize from a regulation on the
defined, particular parcel. If the government defines the relevant
surrounding land interests broadly, then the numerator will expand
and the fraction will come closer to 1/1.
The benefits fraction numerator functions as the direct inverse of
the takings fraction denominator. A takings plaintiff seeks to
horizontally sever the denominator to give the appearance that a
regulation has harmed the relevant parcel as completely as possible.
To this end, the plaintiff asserts that a fee simple denominator (in the
takings fraction) fails to appreciate the regulation's harm, because his
fee simple is too big. Conversely, government seeks to expand the
benefits fraction numerator to give the appearance that a regulation
306. Other uses might provide an equally maximal benefit. Perhaps the lake's best
use for a community is as drinking water. If so, then that use marks the benefits




on the relevant parcel has benefited the surrounding land interests as
completely as possible. To this end, the regulation's supporters assert
that a fee simple numerator (in the benefits fraction) fails to
appreciate the regulation's benefit, because the benefits of the
regulation extend beyond the plaintiff's property, i.e., his fee simple is
too small.
But neither party can refute the other's objective. However
powerful a claimant's arguments are for departing from the fee simple
approach, the same strength will adhere to the government's
argument for likewise departing from the fee simple. The reason is
that the argument on both sides is the same. Both sides argue that the
fee simple is arbitrary. Thus, any property owner who asserts that the
remaining fee simple is irrelevant in assessing a regulation's adverse
impact, may not turn around and claim that the remaining fee simple
is relevant in assessing a regulation's positive impact.
Consider District Intown Properties. v. District of Columbia."°
Washington D.C.'s Historic Preservation Review Board ("Review
Board") designated Cathedral Mansions South, an apartment building
located across from the National Zoo, and its adjacent lawn a
landmark.3" Accordingly, District Intown's application to tear down
the building and lawn to erect eight townhouses was denied.3 9
District Intown argued for horizontally severing its commonly owned,
contiguous fee simple into nine subdivisions, as it had for the
townhouse proposal.310 The court rejected this proposal, applying
Ciampitti's multifactor analysis to find the fee simple the relevant
parcel.3 1
But suppose that the court, whether under the substantiality or
multifactor or Justice Scalia's approach, accepted District Intown's
suggestion to define each severed lot as a relevant parcel. Regardless
of the justification for severance, District Intown would have to
demonstrate that its remaining property bears no relevance in the
takings analysis. But having eliminated the fee simple boundary line
from consideration, District Intown would have opened the door to
considering the benefits to surrounding land interests beyond the fee
simple. To verify District Intown's actual loss, the court must ask
whether the severed, harmed parcel actually benefits the surrounding
land interests by remaining regulated. The District of Columbia could
argue that the relevant surrounding land interests include the National
Zoo, whose visitors benefit from Cathedral Mansions' landmark
designation. District Intown already has convinced the court that the
fee simple boundary line bears no relevance to the measurement of
307. 198 F.3d 874 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
308. See id. at 877.
309. See id. at 877-78.




harm, therefore it will fail to persuade the court that the fee simple
boundary line is of any consequence to the measurement of benefit.
Without the fee simple boundary line, each tiny lot appears to serve
its most beneficial function with the regulation in place. Having
framed the conflict as the loss of one townhouse against the gain of a
substantial benefit to the entire citizenry of Zoo-goers, it is hard to
imagine a court finding the landmark designation responsible for a
compensable taking.
Every government regulation creates benefits. Numerator theory
suggests that, for this reason, government likely will prevail whenever
it may define the relevant surrounding land interests. Such is the case
with nuisances. A government regulation prohibiting the operation of
a nuclear plant atop a fault line drives the benefit numerator so high
that no resultant harm ever will be compensated. Even when such a
regulation's harm to the private land owner is total, the avoidance of
harm-the benefit-to the neighbors also is total, and is multiplied by
the number of benefited neighbors. The benefits fraction also
overwhelmed Penn Central, when the Court emphasized that "the
preservation of landmarks benefits all New York citizens and all
structures, both economically and by improving the quality of life in
the city as a whole. 3 12 Essentially, the "reciprocity of advantage" to
all New Yorkers easily overcame one property owner's suffering.3 '
Undeniably, when government is permitted to define the relevant
surrounding land interests irrespective of the claimant's fee simple,
the definition will always encapsulate so great a benefit that the
property owner never will prevail.
Judge Williams, concurring in District Intown, perceived this
lopsided result, and worse.314  Judge Williams referred to the
beneficial relationship between two adjoining parcels as "synergy. ' 315
Judge Williams aptly noted that within a commonly owned fee simple,
averting the harmful use of one portion of the property often
reciprocates an advantage in other portions of the property.3 16
"Internal synergy" explains the natural absence of billboards in every
residential yard, as even profitable billboards devalue the remainder
of a resident's property. Judge Williams continued with respect to
the case at hand:
312. Penn Central Transp. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 134 (1978).
313. "Reciprocity of advantage" originated with Justice Brandeis's dissent in
Pennsylvania Coal, as a term identifying the mutuality between being constrained by
a government action and being advantaged because others are equally constrained by
the same government action. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 422
(1922) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
314. District Intown, 198 F.3d at 884 (Williams, J., concurring).
315. Id. at 888.
316. See id.
317. Cf. supra text accompanying note 265.
2002] 2003
2004 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 70
Of course, there is another synergy between [the claimant's] two
parcels and adjacent Connecticut Avenue, namely the historical
value that inheres in the preservation of a building as it was initially
constructed (i.e., with an expansive lawn beside it). Uncompensated
landmark preservation seems to rest on this synergy....
Apart from obliterating takings law, such a view has peculiarly
perverse effects in the realm of historic preservation. Although such
laws try to preserve for society the positive externalities created by
buildings like Cathedral Mansions, inflicting the entire cost on the
creator of the landmark... is bound to discourage investment in
first-class design....
... [R]esting uncompensated landmark preservation on the idea
of reciprocal advantage stretches the concept into
meaninglessness. 8
What Judge Williams perhaps would refer to as "external synergy"
is what the government would seek to include in the benefits fraction
numerator, that is, benefits to surrounding land interests beyond the
fee simple. Judge Williams presumably would find that without the
fee simple to limit the government's inclusion of external synergy
under the benefits fraction, takings law would be "obliterated."
Indeed, Judge Williams would be absolutely right. 9
318. District Intown, 198 F.3d at 889-90.
319. Judge Williams did not seize on synergy to criticize horizontal severance,
however. Rather, Judge Williams expressed dissatisfaction with the District Intown
majority's use of Ciampitti's subjective factor analysis to arrive at a fee simple
denominator. Id. at 889. Judge Williams' principle concern was that because "there
will be some synergy between almost any two neighboring parcels under common
ownership," any remaining synergy in a regulated fee simple will thwart a total
takings claim. Id. Judge Williams would prefer a relevant parcel analysis that places a
greater emphasis on the synergy between commonly owned parcels, and on the
proposed, rather than the historical use of those parcels. Id. at 890.
Numerator theory advances that horizontal severance logically implicates an
expanded notion of which synergy "counts" in assessing the benefit of a regulated
parcel on neighboring parcels. Without contiguity and common ownership available
to contain the benefit of regulated land to its neighbors, synergy becomes even easier
to find than Judge Williams feared under the fee simple approach. Any good
resulting from a land use regulation "counts," and any individual's loss would seem
insignificant compared to all that benefit. In short, numerator theory does not share
Judge Williams' starting point, but borrows his conclusion that too much synergy in
the takings analysis will "obliterat[e] takings law." Id. at 889.
But Judge Williams' characterization that the fee simple approach similarly
includes an inordinate amount of synergy finds less support. Underlying Judge
Williams' criticism of the fee simple approach were intermittent references to
Professor Epstein's extreme understanding of the Takings Clause and he repeatedly
expressed resignation with the Supreme Court "militat[ing]" its parcel as a whole
approach with respect to other concepts. Id. at 885, 86, 90. Judge Williams baldly
asserted that the fee simple approach "is at odds with the underlying principle of the
Takings Clause," without offering a statement of that offended "principle." Id. at 887.
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Once the benefits fraction is expanded, the benefit of a land use
regulation always will outweigh the harm to a claimant. A court
considering an expanded benefits fraction will never rule for an
individual property owner. Such a lopsided result indicates numerator
theory's insight on the denominator problem, rather than its obscurity.
Numerator theory is the acceptance of an expanded benefits fraction
as a logical consequence of treating the fee simple as irrelevant. This
Note offers numerator theory not because it is a plausible solution to
the denominator problem, but rather because it demonstrates that the
substantiality, multifactor, and Justice Scalia approaches are
implausible.
2. Economic Substantiality
The benefits fraction does not enter the ordinary takings analysis.
Ordinarily, undertaking to determine the economic impact of a
regulation, a court will use a fee simple denominator and assess the
resulting fraction. If it is 1/1, then the court will rule for compensation
under Lucas.2 If it is less than 1/1, then the court will complete the
Penn Central balancing test.
But another level of inquiry attaches to the substantiality approach.
Economic substantiality proposes that "any identifiable segment of
land is a parcel for purposes of regulatory taking analysis if prior to
regulation it could have been put to at least one economically viable
use, independent of the surrounding land segments.""-  Having
jumped through this hoop, a claimant next must demonstrate that the
regulation "took" all economically beneficial use to prevail under
Lucas . - Fee cautions that "the existence of a post-regulatory use for
the property need not be independent of surrounding land
interests. ''3 3 A court must verify that the remaining portion of the
That unspoken principle is best met, presumably, by limiting the denominator to the
synergy proposed by the property owner. See id. at 886. This view aligns closest with
Fee's substantiality approach, and accordingly meets the same objections. See inf'ra
Part III.B.2.
Judge Williams' tendency toward horizontal severance is disheartening,
because an alternative to dissatisfaction with the Penn Central test is to improve it by
refining the factors or introducing considerations that aid in the fairness inquiry,
rather than by refining the antecedent denominator inquiry. See supra notes 196-197
and accompanying text (asserting the general application of the regulation as the
central takings question); see also Treanor, Takings Clause, supra note 54, at 855-87
(proposing a political process-based theory of the Takings Clause). Simply, if the
problem with takings law is that the Penn Central test inadequately assesses fairness,
then the solution is not horizontal severance.
320. Even a 1/1, total taking, however, will not require compensation when
government is regulating a common law nuisance. See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council,
505 U.S. 1003, 1027 (1992); supra text accompanying notes 83-85.
321. Fee, supra note 167, at 1557.
322. See id.; supra text accompanying notes 259-60.
323. Fee, supra note 167, at 1561; see supra text accompanying notes 263-265.
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claimant's fee simple does not benefit from the regulated, severed
parcel.324  This inquiry serves to check whether a claimant is
attempting deceptively to grab compensation for a regulation from
which, in fact, he already benefits. The benefits fraction enters the
inquiry at this level. Using Judge Williams' terms, when synergy
remains between the relevant parcel and another parcel, then the
claimant will not prevail under Lucas, because there is value in the
synergy.325 But there is no reason to assume that only internal synergy
may be considered in the analysis. External synergy, that is, the
benefit to surrounding land interests beyond the claimant's fee simple,
must factor in as well. Government will have no trouble proving
beneficial external synergy, as that synergy prompted the regulation in
the first place.
A likely response to external synergy is that the purpose of
inquiring into the surrounding land interests is only to verify that a
claimant has not gained by a regulation, when the severed fraction
indicates that the same regulation inflicted a total, or near total loss.
Any effect on property other than the claimant's, i.e., any external
synergy, seems incapable of furthering this inquiry. Indeed, if the
purpose of verifying the economic impact was to find the claimant's
actual gain throughout his property, then such a response is a strong
one. But under substantiality, a claimant's actual gain is no more
relevant than a claimant's actual loss. The relevant loss under
substantiality is the product of imagining that one concept, a
horizontally severed slice of property, is all that a claimant owns.
"Total" takings under substantiality really are "conceptually total"
takings; there is nothing actually "total" about the loss of a small part
of a bigger piece. Verifying the benefit to the surrounding land
interests means measuring not the actual benefit to the claimant, but
rather imagining that the claimant owns enough neighboring property
to appreciate all of a regulation's "conceptual benefit." Although
there is nothing actual about the benefit to the plaintiff, this fact
should not bother the substantiality advocate.
On a broader level, the benefits fraction is meant to illustrate that
when a claimant asks a court to ignore real fee simple boundary lines,
then that claimant is essentially asking the court to ignore the actual
impact of the government regulation. Substantiality deals with losses
to conceptually independent parcels of land. Yet, real parcels never
are independent; the value of one relies on the use of others.
Government regulation of land use responds to the interdependence
between neighboring properties, and substantiality's notion of
independence fails to grasp that undeniable interdependence.
324. Fee, supra note 167, at 1562.
325. See supra notes 314-19 and accompanying text.
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If substantiality suggests an inferior approach, this should not come
as a surprise. Fee posits that "[t]he only cases in which the standard of
independent economic viability would produce a different result are
those in which a different result should occur," according to "the
principles of fairness and justice underlying the Fifth Amendment." 6
Fee scarcely offers any explanation of the sort of justice that he
invokes. Reasonable expectations and the character of the
government action, two factors thought necessary for achieving fair
results in most takings cases,327 find no place in the substantiality
approach. The absence of reasonable expectations in Fee's approach
is particularly conspicuous, as the second sentence of Fee's article
emphasizes that at the time of purchase in Lucas, "[Lucas's] building
plans violated no existing regulations."3"
Substantiality instead derives from the premise that if Lucas can
recover on a total taking, then P also should recover on a total taking.
"Fairness and justice" presumably would carry out the principles
behind Lucas's categorical takings rule to P's advantage, because,
aside from P's two upland acres, Lucas and P are similarly situated.
But substantiality's premise is faulty, because none of the
justifications asserted in Lucas for total takings apply to P.- First,
from P's point of view, the total economic loss of eighteen acres of his
property is not the equivalent of a physical appropriation. Indeed,
Nollan's fundamental right to exclude remains in the wetlands
portion, and this right may benefit P's remaining upland portion in
both economic and non-economic ways.3  Second, P's case is not
"relatively rare." The extraordinary setting that has driven the Lucas
rule from the outset is not present in P's situation, because
government regulations are more likely to impact segments of
property than whole fee simples..3 1 Third, P's case holds less of a
likelihood that government has singled his property out for the
subversive purpose of dedicating it for public service without paying
for it.
The economic substantiality approach contravenes established
regulatory takings principles. Without such support, Fee's approach
instead appears to be an attempt to apply a principle of physical
takings law to regulatory takings. Loretto held that the magnitude of
a physical taking holds no consequence for the Takings Clause;
326. Fee, supra note 167, at 1562 (emphasis omitted).
327. See supra notes 97-116 and accompanying text; see generally Michelman,
Property, supra note 16.
328. Fee, supra note 167, at 1535.
329. See supra notes 78-81 and accompanying text.
330. In Lucas, no segment of Lucas's fee simple remained to inherit the benefit of
the right to exclude on adjacent parcels. See supra text accompanying notes 74-75.




compensation is due even for the smallest of physical infringements.332
No such principle applies in regulatory takings, however. The Court
has developed entirely distinct bodies of regulatory takings and
physical takings jurisprudence.333 Fairness is not a criteria in physical
takings law, but it is the overarching purpose of regulatory takings
law. Transferring principles from physical takings to regulatory
takings is an imprudent, and unsupportable measure.334
3. The Multifactor Approach
The multifactor approach, which considers the subjective intent of
the property owner in the takings denominator,335 comes under
scrutiny similar to the substantiality approach. First, the multifactor
approach invites the benefits fraction. To verify the intent of a
claimant, a court using the multifactor approach must inquire into a
claimant's remaining holdings.336 In particular, the inquiry must reveal
whether the remaining holdings benefit from the imposed regulation
on the affected parcel.337 P, for example, would not proceed on
separate development schemes for the wetlands and uplands parcels,
if those combined schemes would net less economic benefit than one,
unified scheme for the whole fee simple. Thus, a court must verify
that P is not claiming a taking of a property interest that, acting
rationally, he never would have pursued.
But if the intent behind the development scheme adequately
defines the harm, then the intent behind the regulation defines the
benefit with equal adequacy. In other words, once the multifactor
approach deems the fee simple irrelevant for assessing a "conceptual
taking," it remains irrelevant in the assessment of "conceptual
332. See, e.g., Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419
(1982). Loretto's giant step at the Supreme Court level translated to a small step on
remand, when the New York Court of Appeals awarded her $1 for suffering the
permanent physical invasion of a cable wire dangling across her Manhattan apartment
building. See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 446 N.E.2d 428
(1983).
333. Compare Pennsylvania Coal Company v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922), with
Transp. Co. v. Chicago, 99 U.S. 635, 642 (1878), and Loretto, 458 U.S. at 432. See
Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 121 S. Ct. 2448, 2463 (2001) (noting that physical takings
"by invocation of the State's power of eminent domain, presents different
considerations than cases alleging a taking based on a burdensome regulation"); see
supra notes 64-67 and accompanying text.
334. Cf Palazzolo, 121 S. Ct. at 2463. For the Court, Justice Kennedy contrasted
the rules in physical and regulatory takings for when a taking has occurred. In
physical takings, "it is a general rule.., that any award goes to the owner at the time
of the taking, and that the right to compensation is not passed to a subsequent
purchaser." Id. In regulatory takings, however, the right to compensation can pass to
a subsequent purchaser. Id. at 2462-64. Transferring one rule into the other body of
law, even on a seemingly identical issue, did not work.
335. See supra Part II.D.
336. See supra Part II.D.
337. See supra note 229 and accompanying text.
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benefit." Consider, for example, Palm Beach, in which the Federal
Circuit relied on PBIA's different development schemes for the
upland and lake portions of its 312 acre fee simple to horizontally
sever 51 acres for the relevant parcel?-' The court determined that
PBIA should not fail merely because it happened to ovn339 261 acres
as part of the same development scheme. But admitting this
happenstance, the Federal Circuit should have considered numerator
theory, because it likewise was happenstance that PBIA did not
possess the surrounding land interests relevant to the disposition, or
development scheme, of Lake Worth. When the court allowed that
PBIA should not suffer because it owned too much, it should have
allowed that the government, and ultimately the taxpayers, should not
suffer because PBIA owned too little.
Second, placing critical priority on the subjective intent of the
property owner creates a disordered, manipulable test.
Commentators have been critical of the Federal Circuit's recent
takings jurisprudence for this reason.' Dubious land transfers and
confidently asserted intent can make the difference between a fully
compensable, total taking, and no compensation at all.-
Third, the multifactor approach appears to be an attempt to
squeeze the entire takings inquiry into the denominator analysis.
Admittedly, a court must approach the denominator problem
carefully because the resulting takings fraction greatly influences the
final adjudication of a case. 2 But the multifactor approach misplaces
pieces of the ultimate takings inquiry into the denominator analysis,
where they do not belong. The Court invokes the three-factor Penn
Central test to assess fairness in regulatory takings. The denominator
problem is a troubling legal issue for how to define one factor:
economic impact on the claimant. The subjective intent of the
claimant has a place in the takings inquiry, but under the second
factor: reasonable investment-backed expectations. - 3  Placing the
intent of the claimant under the first factor, the Federal Circuit
masquerades the multifactor approach as a wholly-contained fairness
test.344 But as more than mere mindset is needed to determine
338. See Palm Beach Isles Assocs. v. United States, 208 F.3d 1374, 1381 (Fed. Cir.
2000); supra text accompanying note 246.
339. It was disputed in Palm Beach which regulation, in fact, prompted the denial
of PBIA's permit, and therefore whether PBIA "owned" the 261 acres at the time of
the regulation remained unresolved. See supra note 249 and accompanying text.
340. See Fee, supra note 167, at 1536; Recent Cases, Regulatory Takings, supra note
160, at 931; Huffman, supra note 29, at 600-15.
341. See supra text accompanying notes 256-58.
342. See supra text accompanying notes 28-30.
343. See Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 121 S. Ct. 2448, 2466 (2001) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
344. See Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 28 F.3d 1171, 1181 (Fed. Cir.




whether a government regulation has unfairly burdened a private
individual, 5 the multifactor approach seems under-equipped to
administer that test.
4. Historically Cognizable Property Rights
Justice Scalia's footnote seven 46 represents the superior approach
among the versions of horizontal severance. It assures that a claimant
will not succeed in severing the fee simple without historical
understanding to support his claim. Unlike the substantiality and
multifactor approaches, Justice Scalia's approach couches the relevant
parcel analysis in traditional understanding of property interests.347
The standard, fee simple approach implicitly rests on the same
traditional acceptance, on the "rich tradition of protection at common
law." 34 But the fee simple approach restricts the applicability of
historical acceptance, its advocates perhaps assuming that no other
property rights enjoy the same "rich tradition" as does the fee simple.
Justice Scalia's approach would unrestrict that premise and apply it to
every asserted property interest, thereby debasing the assumption that
only the fee simple enjoys traditional recognition among property
interests.
Three criticisms nonetheless pervade historically cognizable
property rights. First, as with any version of horizontal severance,
Justice Scalia's approach fails to account for the benefits of the
disputed regulation. Admittedly, the approach does not directly
implicate the benefits fraction. Historically cognizable property rights
can be severed without ever accounting for the property rights
remaining in a fee simple. Justice Scalia's approach differs in this
respect from the substantiality and multifactor approaches, each of
which requires a court to take notice of the value remaining in the fee
simple to make a relevant parcel determination in the takings fraction.
No additional inquiry into the relationship between the impacted
parcel and the remaining fee simple is required to implement Justice
Scalia's approach. Without the additional inquiry, the Lucas footnote
seven approach does not open the door to the benefits fraction.
However, while severing according to historically cognizable
property rights does not directly implicate the benefits fraction, the
inquiry under Justice Scalia's approach is no more complete for
avoiding it. Fractional harm appears whole under Justice Scalia's view
merely as a result of historical recognition. When historical
recognition gives the appearance of a total taking, government only
345. See supra Part I.A.4.
346. See supra Part II.C.
347. See supra text accompanying notes 205-09.
348. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1016 n.7 (1992); see supra notes
183-86 and accompanying text.
2010 [Vol. 70
REGULATORY TAKINGS LAW
has one opportunity to notify the court of the taxpayer's competing
interest, by invoking the Lucas exception for common law nuisances.
Countervailing considerations, such as whether a limitation on a
historically recognized property right offers a necessary,
disproportionate benefit to adjacent property, never enlighten the
dispute. Unless government is, in fact, merely codifying common law,
a court will not even allow the government to state the reason the
legislature has enacted the regulation. The scale proposed by Justice
Scalia weighs only one side of the takings balance.
Lucas itself operates a faulty scale as applied to horizontally
severed parcels. When the takings balance weighs against a
landowner, Lucas holds that the landowner will nonetheless prevail.
The Lucas rule presumes that even when the benefit to the public
outweighs the harm to the individual, the unique loss of an
economically devastated fee simple nonetheless merits
compensation. 349 But, as noted above, none of the justifications for
the total takings category apply when property is horizontally
severed.350 Without support from the justifications for the Lucas rule,
horizontally severed parcels enjoy no presumption, or, faulty scale.
Second, the approach articulated in footnote seven of Lucas
threatens to freeze the law against society's progress. The
denominator problem often pits those who would exercise common
law property rights against those governments regulating to reshape
those same common law rights. Under Justice Scalia's approach,
though, the moment that a property right gains enough "legal
recognition," the government forever loses its power to reshape that
property right. This is because the historical legal recognition will
facilitate shoehorning the takings fraction into 1/1, and the landowner
will prevail under Lucas before the arguments for reshaping the
historically recognized right-i.e., the character of the government
action-ever will be heard in court.
Justice Stevens advanced this argument in Lucas, but not with
respect to the denominator problem. 51 Rather, Justice Stevens aimed
at Lucas's common law nuisance exception. -  Because the
government only will escape compensation if its regulation codifies an
existing restraint on the relevant property, the nuisance exception is
frozen in time at the moment of the Lucas decision. Justice Stevens
offered an example: "if a State should decide to prohibit the
manufacture of asbestos, cigarettes, or concealable firearms, for
example, it must be prepared to pay for the adverse economic
consequences of its decision." '353 With respect to the footnote seven
349. See supra note 96.
350. See supra text accompanying notes 329-31.
351. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1068-69 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
352. See supra notes 83-86 and accompanying text.
353. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1068 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Such an outcome would
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approach to the denominator problem, the example needs only slight
modification: if a state should decide to prohibit one destructive,
unchecked, historically cognizable property right, it must be prepared
to lose under Lucas footnote seven without a court balancing the
character of its decision.3
The frozen law objection to Justice Scalia's approach, like the
definitional objection,355 perhaps can be resolved without modifying
the approach. Even when historically cognizable property rights are
frozen so that loss of one such right equals a takings fraction of 1/1,
the government can counter that it is regulating according to its
evolving conception of general safety, welfare, and health. In other
words, even if severing "concepts" are frozen, an unfrozen conception
of the police power will keep takings law in step with contemporary
understanding of what land uses harm the general public.
For example, one understanding of Pennsylvania Coal may be that
because support rights were bargained for and historically recognized
in Pennsylvania, such rights were frozen against the state's efforts to
change them via the Kohler Act.35 a But perhaps if the state could
have forwarded evidence, say, of a massive, destructive geological
ripple effect of subsidence, and that the recently discovered
destruction substantially harmed the general welfare, then the state
may have overcome even the total loss of a frozen property right with
a "rich tradition. ' 357
A third objection to Justice Scalia's approach is that it fails to
square with important regulatory takings precedent. In Penn Central,
for example, air rights certainly enjoyed historically cognizable
recognition, as New York City had worked an elaborate scheme for
zoning and transferring those rights,358 yet the Court rejected the
attempt to sever those rights. Keystone, from which Justice Scalia
dissented, refused to sever a historically cognizable property right.359
directly contradict established Court doctrine. See Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623
(1887).
354. The awkward result of frozen property rights can be illustrated by Euclid.
Under footnote seven, in 1922, Ambler Realty could have severed its commonly
accepted right to develop its property unfettered, asserted a taking similar to
Pennsylvania Coal, and prevailed. But had Ambler Realty instead brought suit in
2001, either it would fail, or unfettered development would still be the norm, leaving
pigs in everyone's parlor.
355. See supra text accompanying note 211.
356. See supra notes 206-09 and accompanying text.
357. Cf Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470,488 (1987)
("The Subsidence Act is a prime example that 'circumstances may so change in
time.., as to clothe with such a [public] interest what at other times... would be a
matter of purely private concern."' (alterations in original) (quoting Block v. Hirsh,
256 U.S. 135, 155 (1921))).
358. See Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 42 N.Y.2d 324,328 (1977).
359. See supra notes 129-30 and accompanying text.
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Implementing Justice Scalia's approach would require reversing these
bedrock Supreme Court cases.
C. The Fee Simple Approach and The Fairness Principle
Horizontal severance, the vehicle by which P seeks more than three
million dollars for the lost vision of his eighteen saltwater-soaked
acres, has run into several objections, including numerator theory,
adverse Supreme Court precedent, and traditional, common sense
understanding of the boundary lines that divide property. The fee
simple approach, on the other hand, weathers each of these
objections.
First, the fee simple approach does not suffer under numerator
theory. As the fee simple boundary line is relevant in assessing a
regulation's harm, the boundary line remains to enclose the scope of
the benefits numerator. Under the fee simple approach, the only
relevant beneficial impact of a contested regulation is that upon the
claimant. Thereby constrained, the benefits fraction merely
completes the measurement of the actual impact on the individual
property owner. In Judge Williams' terms, the fee simple serves to
exclude consideration of external synergy,- thereby limiting the
benefit assessment to internal synergy-the way that the regulated use
of a parcel affects the remainder of the commonly owned property.
The benefits fraction reveals that the fee simple draws anything but
an arbitrary boundary line for the denominator."' The fee simple
strikes the correct balance between construing a regulation's harm too
narrowly, and construing its benefit too broadly.
Horizontal severance, in any form, requires conceptualizing
property as a collection of fragmented parts, each of which functions
apart from the others. The benefits fraction, unconstrained by the fee
simple, conceptualizes property as an unified whole. Under this
conception, the use of one part is so vital to the rest that government
appears a necessary land manager, because the legislature more ably
accounts for that unity than any individual private property owner.
But these conceptions are extreme, property is no more completely
independent than it is completely interdependent. The fee simple
approach strikes a necessary balance between the competing
conceptions. It appreciates that property is divided into estates owned
by individuals, but that preserved within the estates are a number of
interdependent rights. Restated according to the familiar metaphor 2
horizontal severance recognizes the sticks but ignores that they are
bundled. The unconstrained benefits fraction recognizes the bundle
360. See supra notes 314-19 and accompanying text.
361. See supra notes 202-04 and accompanying text.




but ignores that it is made up of sticks. Only the fee simple approach
appreciates the completed metaphor, that property is a bundle of
sticks.
Second, recognition of the fee simple underlies much of Supreme
Court regulatory takings jurisprudence.363 Penn Central, Keystone,
and Concrete Pipe each rely on the fee simple to assess the true impact
of government regulations on respective individuals. 364 Lucas relies
even more heavily on the fee simple approach, as the Court
particularly sympathized with the complete loss of Lucas's property.
The emphasis throughout Lucas remains on the landowner's complete
economic loss of all of both of his beachfront lots. 365 Although Justice
Scalia lamented that the "rhetorical force" of the total takings rule "is
greater than its precision,' 366 clearly the precise force of the rule is
supported by the tradition of the fee simple in regulatory takings law,
and the special harm occasioned by its total economic deprivation.
Moreover, the tradition of the fee simple also supports generally
government's role as land use regulator. Rhode Island's Coastal
Resource Management Council, for example, operates on the
assumption that it can constitutionally adjust the uses of segments of
wetlands parcels, provided that it does not destroy the value of all of
an individual's property.3 67 The Clean Water Act also operates on the
premise that government has the authority to regulate individual uses
of land when necessary to the public interest."6 The Act remains
effective under the fee simple approach, because when it regulates a
parcel smaller than the fee simple a court will balance the competing
interests of the individual and the Act, rather than rule per se for the
individual. The Clean Water Act and similar legislation need the fee
simple approach to the denominator to carry out their respective
purposes.
Third, frequent use of the fee simple approach throughout takings
law is no accident.369  The fee simple approach fits with common
understanding of the method by which real property is divided.370 The
reason is that "[tihe sum of the rights in the parts can not be greater
than the rights in the whole. 3 71 In accordance with Justice Brandeis's
axiom, the value of a use for one parcel only can be assessed relative
to a property holder's adjacent property. Returning to an example
363. See supra notes 183-86 and accompanying text.
364. See supra Part I.B.1.
365. See, e.g., Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1018, 1020 (1992).
366. Id. at 1016 n.7; see supra text accompanying notes 330-32.
367. See, e.g., supra notes 1-5 and accompanying text.
368. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
369. Contra Fee, supra note 167, at 1550; see supra notes 203-04 and accompanying
text.
370. See supra note 183 and accompanying text.




above,372 perhaps erecting a billboard on the front lawn of a residence
presents a valuable use, but the relative value of that use with respect
to the fee simple is less because the billboard devalues the residence.
Tallying the use of the billboard and the residence independently
grosses an illusory total, because the real value of the two uses is the
net between them. Common understanding by residents keeps
billboards off of front lawns. Common understanding by legislators
does the same for a community, so that the value of independent fee
simples is not offset because of mutually harmful uses. The fee simple
approach translates common understanding into legal understanding,
as it allows a court to evaluate a regulation's impact relative to an
individual's remaining adjacent property.
The fee simple approach, finally, offers the superior method for
defining the relevant parcel. In P's case, the answer to the initial legal
question, therefore, is that P's loss is best measured as 18/20.- The
economic impact of the CRMC's regulatory action is 90% lost
development potential. P has not established a total taking, and must
proceed under the balancing test. P's reasonable investment-backed
expectations and the character of the government action enter the
analysis at this juncture.
Under the reasonable investment-backed expectations prong, P
now admits that he obtained title to the twenty-acre parcel after
Rhode Island had enacted regulations to prevent filling coastal
wetlands.374 While this fact will not bar P's claim, it remains crucial to
the analysis. Indeed, in Palazzolo Justice O'Connor affirmed the
relevance of the timing of the acquisition of title, saying:
[I]f existing regulations do nothing to inform the analysis, then some
property owners may reap windfalls and an important indicium of
fairness is lost.... [O]ur decision today does not remove the
regulatory backdrop against which an owner takes title to property
from the purview of the Penn Central inquiry. It simply restores
balance to that inquiry. Courts properly consider the effect of
existing regulations under the rubric of investment-backed
expectations in determining whether a compensable taking has
occurred.375
P, it turns out, was on notice about the risks of the eighteen wetlands
acres.
372 See supra text accompanying note 317.
373. It is worth noting that Palazzolo's is a tougher takings case than most with
respect to the denominator problem. Few regulation-inflicted losses will command
the same sympathy as does Palazzolo's loss. This Note uses Palazzolo because it
presents horizontal severance's best case, and still horizontal severance fails in that
case to adequately account for necessary competing interests. Most takings claimants,
however, withstand less diminution in value than did Palazzolo. In those more
common cases, horizontal severance presents an even less prudent approach.
374. See Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 121 S. Ct. 2448,2462 (2001).
375. Id. at 2467 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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The timing of the land acquisition certainly is vital to the takings
analysis, as it diminishes both sympathy for P and the leverage P
gained by the severe economic impact. Yet three of the horizontal
severance approaches never would have reached this critical factor.376
The libertarian approach would have immediately awarded
compensation. Substantiality would have credited P with a total
taking, as the wetlands owned independent development possibilities
and Rhode Island would not meet Lucas's common law nuisance
exception. The multifactor approach would focus on P's intent to
build (even amidst the regulatory scheme),377 then severe the wetlands
intended for development and award compensation, again, under
Lucas.
Reasonable investment-backed expectations is one of the factors
used to determine whether "[g]overnment [is] forcing some people
alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should
be borne by the public as a whole. '378 This is the Armstrong principle.
The Supreme Court explicitly developed the three-factor test as the
means to resolve takings cases according to this principle of fairness.379
The Takings Clause requires that courts compare the needs of the
individual property owner with the needs of the general public.
Beginning with the fundamental fairness principle, the Court has
found that the comparison is best made by avoiding any "set
formula," and by instead gathering as much relevant information as
possible in a takings dispute.8
Yet the theory behind horizontal severance is that less information
better serves the takings inquiry. The libertarian, substantiality,
multifactor, and Justice Scalia's approach each advocate that when the
correct concept is present, segments of an individual's property should
be eliminated from the analysis. By eliminating these segments, these
approaches frame all degrees of infringements as total takings,
thereby funneling claims into Lucas before the fairness principle ever
gets addressed. In this way, each of these approaches is impermissibly
narrow in its application.
Consistent with the Armstrong principle, the fee simple approach
best preserves the balancing process in takings law. The resolution of
376. Whether Justice Scalia's approach would have favored P's takings claim needs
a more specific illustration. But examples of an inequitable result using historically
cognizable property rights are not hard to imagine. For example, if only one of
Lucas's lots suffered under South Carolina's regulation, and if the regulation went
into effect before Lucas obtained the land, Justice Scalia's approach still would
calculate a total taking.
377. Cf. Palm Beach Isles Assocs. v. United States, 208 F.3d 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2000)
(deferring to plaintiffs intent to build even amidst contrary regulatory scheme); see
supra notes 241-49 and accompanying text.
378. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960); see Treanor, Armstrong,
supra note 32.
379. Penn Central Transp. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 123-24 (1978).
380. Id.
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regulatory takings cases depends on a balance of competing interests:
the right of the individual to use and enjoy his property, against the
right of society to improve general health, safety, and welfare. When
a regulation overburdens the individual, the balance fairly tips toward
finding a compensable taking. When a regulation proportionately
burdens the individual in furtherance of health, safety, and welfare,
then the balance fairly tips toward upholding the regulation without
compensating the individual. The denominator problem does not
encompass the ultimate takings question, and precisely for this reason,
horizontal severance does not answer it.
Notes & Observations
